Washington Law Review
Volume 93

Number 1

3-1-2018

Exposing Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right of Access to
Electronic Surveillance Orders
Hannah Bloch-Wehba
hbw@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right of Access to Electronic
Surveillance Orders, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 145 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol93/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington Law Review at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Bloch-Wehba (Ready to Pub)

3/26/2018 11:06 AM

EXPOSING SECRET SEARCHES: A FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
ORDERS
Hannah Bloch-Wehba*
Abstract: Although, as a rule, court proceedings and judicial records are presumptively
open to the public, electronic surveillance documents are exceptions. Like ordinary search
warrants, surveillance applications are considered ex parte. But court orders frequently
remain sealed indefinitely, even when there is no basis for continued secrecy. Indeed,
secrecy—in the form of gag orders, local judicial rules, and even clerical filing and docketing
practices—is built into the laws that regulate electronic surveillance.
This Article argues that this widespread secrecy violates the First Amendment right of
access to court proceedings and documents. The history of search and seizure shows that, far
from requiring secrecy, searches and seizures were historically executed in public, with
neighbors watching and even participating. Secrecy surrounding searches and seizures is a
relatively new development, linked to the emergence of communications technology and
laws governing the acquisition of customer records from third-party service providers.
Transparency would play an especially positive role in this context because electronic
surveillance is otherwise virtually insulated from public scrutiny: basic information about the
scope of the government’s authority to conduct surveillance and data regarding the frequency
with which it does so is largely unavailable to the public. Sealing also obscures the
government’s interpretations of its own legal authority, as well as information about law
enforcement technologies.
These twin arguments—historical and logical—establish a basis for courts to recognize
that a First Amendment right of access attaches to surveillance materials after an
investigation has concluded. While the government may have a compelling need for secrecy
of surveillance materials in ongoing investigations, there is no government interest
sufficiently compelling to warrant the sealing of tens of thousands of judicial documents long
after an investigation has concluded.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year, the government files thousands of ex parte applications
seeking orders compelling communications service providers like
Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft to provide
access to customer records pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute1 and the
Stored Communications Act (SCA).2 The vast majority of the
applications, and the orders granting them, are issued under seal.3 Recent
data suggests that, at least in some districts, only 0.1% of electronic
surveillance requests ever become public.4 Indeed, many of these
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012).
2. Id. § 2703.
3. See TIM REAGAN & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED CASES IN FEDERAL
COURTS 21–22 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealcafc.pdf/$file/sealcafc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PM7-Y&MF] [hereinafter FJC STUDY].
4. See Spencer S. Hsu & Rachel Weiner, U.S. Courts: Electronic Surveillance Up 500 Percent in
D.C.-Area Since 2011, Almost All Sealed Cases, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016),
http://wapo.st/2lgRxeW [https://perma.cc/BWJ9-YJAH].
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applications and orders are made within entirely secret dockets
unavailable to the public at all.5 The recipients frequently receive gag
orders directing them not to notify any person of the existence of the
order.6 While federal and state judges occasionally publish opinions in
exceptional cases raising novel statutory issues, most of the requests are
never acknowledged in published decisions. The result—an immense
and growing docket of secret legal decisions issued in connection with
criminal investigations.7
Many of these secret orders raise important constitutional and
statutory issues. For example, does the Pen/Trap Statute authorize the
use of a cell site simulator, sometimes also known as a stingray?8 Only a
few courts have issued public opinions explaining the legal authority for
using stingrays to conduct communications surveillance.9 One
magistrate judge in the Northern District of Illinois, issuing an order
imposing particular minimization requirements for the use of stingrays,
noted that the “dearth of case law discussing these devices” prevented
the court from even being aware of whether “judges may be allowing the

5. See, e.g., Application of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press to Unseal & for
Other Appropriate Relief, In re Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance
Applications & Orders, No. 1:13-mc-00712-BAH (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2017), ECF No. 18 (“Such
applications and orders are routinely maintained under seal indefinitely, even when the related
investigation is no longer active, and are generally not reflected on publicly available court
dockets.”).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (setting out requirements for separate nondisclosure order); id.
§ 3123(d) (requiring an order for installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace to direct that
the recipient “not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence
of the investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered
by the court”).
7. See generally Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret
Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313 (2012); Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse:
Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 177 (2009).
8. Stingrays are devices that pose as cell towers, forcing nearby cell phones to connect, and
monitor call information.
9. United States v. Tutis, 216 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484–85 (D.N.J. 2016) (denying motion to suppress
evidence obtained after investigators obtained a communications data warrant authorizing use of a
cell site simulator); United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d. 606, 614–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(granting motion to suppress evidence obtained after DEA investigators obtained a pen register
authorizing stingray use); In re The Application of the United States for an Order Relating to Tels.
Used by Suppressed, No. 15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015) (“This
opinion explains this Court’s requirements relating to the use of cell-site simulators in a typical
drug-trafficking investigation.”); In re The Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747,
752 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (requiring a search warrant for use of a stingray).
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use of cell-site simulators without possessing a complete understanding
of the device and how it works.”10
New policing technologies like stingrays present urgent questions
about how courts should apply legal protections in novel settings, but the
public is frequently uncertain about the answers. What’s more, those
new technologies are only seldom regulated ex ante. Legislation
prescribing, for example, how police use automated license plate
readers, drones, x-ray backscatter vans, ShotSpotter systems, or facial
recognition software is haphazard or nonexistent. Public debate about
the appropriate use of these technologies is usually reactive, not
proactive.
Against this background, the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA stand
apart: these statutes regulate when, how, and upon what standard police
may acquire information about communications, directly from thirdparty service providers. Both federal and state law enforcement agencies
rely on their ability to obtain information concerning electronic
communications to investigate crimes ranging from Social Security
Disability fraud11 and robbery12 to investigations of Wikileaks13 and the
Inauguration Day “riots.”14 These statutes govern how investigators can
obtain both content and metadata of electronic communications, either in
stored form or in real time.15 Yet even though these techniques are
subject to ex ante judicial review, they remain virtually insulated from
public scrutiny and oversight.
Nor does the Fourth Amendment, which traditionally has regulated
police investigations, appear to require much in the way of transparency.
In general, the Fourth Amendment might require that police give notice
when they execute a search or seizure warrant.16 But the Constitution
requires only that the person searched receive notice, not that the
10. 2015 WL 6871289, at *2.
11. In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 231, 239 (N.Y. 2017).
12. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017).
13. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d),
707 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2013).
14. Adam Edelman, Feds Demand Facebook Share Information on Anti-Trump Protesters, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017, 3:19 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/fedsdemand-facebook-share-information-anti-trump-protesters-n805801 [https://perma.cc/E6FH-PSQ7].
15. See infra tbl.1.
16. See, e.g., City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999) (requiring that law
enforcement give property owners “[i]ndividualized notice” after property is seized); Jonathan
Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth Amendment “Rule
Requiring Notice,” 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 527–28 (2014).
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government notify the general public or otherwise expose its practices to
public inspection. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that the “success” of electronic surveillance “depends on
secrecy.”17 Moreover, many communications surveillance scenarios
involve no search warrant, and therefore no Fourth Amendment
protections at all.18
Many scholars have grappled with critical substantive questions
concerning the constitutionality of communications surveillance through
the lens of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.19 Although warrantless
communications surveillance of this type might violate substantive First
Amendment rights,20 and imposing gag orders may constitute an
unlawful prior restraint,21 only rarely have scholars focused on the
secrecy of surveillance in ordinary criminal investigations as a
substantive and procedural harm.22
The indefinite concealment from public view of electronic
surveillance applications and orders violates the public’s First
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings and documents and
17. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967).
18. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (holding that individuals have no
expectation of privacy in historical cell site location information obtained from service providers);
see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v.
Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513
(11th Cir. 2015) (same), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); In re Application of the United States
for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013) (same).
19. See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Keynote Address: The Path to ECPA Reform and the
Implications of United States v. Jones, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 225 (2012); Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone
Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681
(2011); Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell
Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2013); Stephanie K. Pell &
Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement
Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2012);
Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The
Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security
and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014).
20. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Process Without Procedure: National Security Letters and First
Amendment Rights, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367 (2016); Gerald J. Votava III, First Amendment
Concerns in Governmental Acquisition and Analysis of Mobile Device Location Data, 13 U. PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013); Rebecca Wexler, Note, Gags as Guidance: Expanding Notice of
National Security Letter Investigations to Targets and the Public, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 325
(2016).
21. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2330
(2014) (“[D]igital surveillance necessitates wide ranging use of prior restraint . . . .”).
22. Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 589 (2007); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret
Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843 (2014);
see also Bloch-Wehba, supra note 20; Wexler, supra note 20.
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endangers our ability to hold police accountable for their actions.23 Part I
of this Article evaluates the application of the First Amendment right of
access to warrantless electronic surveillance orders. Under the First
Amendment, the public has a qualified right of access to government
proceedings and documents where there is a history of public access and
where openness serves a positive function.24 Appellate courts have split,
however, regarding the application of this test to judicial proceedings
that are the creation of statute and have little or no historical precedent.25
Secrecy of electronic surveillance orders and applications also implicates
recognized rights of access to docket sheets and judicial orders.
While secrecy now appears to be baked into huge swaths of
investigative activity, historically this was not always the case. Section
II.A illustrates how, at the framing of the Fourth Amendment, searches
and seizures occurred in public, in real time and space, with neighbors
and strangers watching and even participating as constables and customs
officers rifled through homes, offices, and shops. The open and publicly
accountable nature of searches and seizures was a key feature that
fostered popular opposition to the scourges of general warrants and writs
of assistance, promoted public understanding of the law of search and
seizure, and ultimately led to the framers’ adoption of the Fourth
Amendment in order to restrain the government from warrantless and
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Technological evolution prompted law enforcement investigations to
become less transparent over time, as set forth in section II.B. Beginning
with the Supreme Court’s 1928 holding in Olmstead v. United States26
that eavesdropping, without physical trespass, did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment “search,”27 investigations became much more opaque.
Under the Olmstead holding and subsequent federal legislation, law
enforcement was permitted to eavesdrop without a warrant—but was not
allowed to use the evidence against a defendant in criminal

23. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827
(2015).
24. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
25. Compare, e.g., id., and United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing that the fact that certain hearings have no historical counterpart does not preclude a
right of access), with In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir. 2013), and United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158,
161 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasizing the requirement of a history of access, even to novel
proceedings).
26. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
27. Id. at 466.
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proceedings.28 As a result, eavesdropping and wiretapping were
occurring out of the eye of the public, unmoored from constitutional
protections, and unmonitored by the courts. When, nearly half a century
later, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects intangible
conversations from unreasonable, unwarrantless searches,29 the
application of the warrant requirement should have brought searches
back into the public eye. But instead, when Congress enacted legislation
to govern electronic surveillance, protect individual rights, and regulate
law enforcement, these laws frequently codified sweeping nondisclosure
requirements as well.30
Making warrantless communications surveillance documents more
transparent to the public also serves logical ends. Section III.A
demonstrates that transparency of electronic surveillance applications
and orders plays a critical role in ensuring the integrity of the process for
authorizing surveillance and in the criminal justice process more
broadly. Increasing transparency would boost the ability of judges,
regulators, and the public to understand the methods, techniques,
procedures, and legal reasoning that undergird communications
surveillance. Even though the government applies for court orders ex
parte, subjecting applications and orders to public scrutiny may deter
police and prosecutorial misconduct. In addition, many of the traditional
Fourth Amendment safeguards are absent in the statutory framework for
electronic surveillance. The warrantless surveillance context lacks both
ex ante safeguards like probable cause and prior notice, as well as the
classic ex post remedy of exclusion.31 In the Fourth Amendment setting,
all three of these safeguards serve values of transparency by facilitating
public scrutiny of the investigative process.
When police conduct, law enforcement tools, and the very rules that
govern policing are cloaked in secrecy, it has systemic effects beyond a
single defendant or criminal case, as set forth in section III.B. Law
enforcement’s failure to publicly acknowledge the use of new
technologies keeps that technology out of the public eye and limits

28. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56
ALA. L. REV. 9, 28 (2004) (discussing the government’s “aggressive interpretations” of the
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1100 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958)
(amended 1968))).
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (2012) (codifying sealing requirement in the Pen/Trap Statute);
id. § 2518 (same, for Wiretap Act).
31. See United States v. Rigmaiden, No. 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *10 (D. Ariz.
May 8, 2013) (“Suppression is not an available remedy for violations of the SCA.”).
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debate about its appropriate use. The development of a secret body of
law keeps judges from a full understanding of how to apply existing
statutes and constitutional protections to new policing tools. The absence
of even basic information about how frequently police use electronic
surveillance tools makes it impossible to understand whether law
enforcement is abusing its authority.
Part IV details why recognizing a right of access to electronic
surveillance applications and orders strikes an appropriate balance
between three competing objectives: law enforcement’s need for
secrecy, individual privacy, and the transparency essential to democratic
accountability. Even if the First Amendment right of access attaches, it
can be overcome if the government demonstrates that it has a compelling
need for secrecy and the closure is narrowly tailored to meet that need.
While the right of access might be overcome while an investigation is
pending and surveillance is ongoing, changes in circumstances likely
allow the applications and orders to become public later in time. Courts
can also protect the privacy rights of individuals whose surveillance
records may be unsealed through narrowly tailored redactions rather
than wholesale secrecy. The classic methods of safeguarding private
information in court filings—careful redactions and limitations on the
duration of sealing—are equally useful in the surveillance context.
Electronic surveillance laws today have entrenched secrecy by design,
limiting transparency in ways that hamper democratic accountability and
impede public understanding of critical aspects of the criminal justice
process. Secrecy is not just an accidental byproduct of the investigative
process, but a sought-after result. Holding electronic surveillance to the
same standards of transparency as physical searches would demonstrably
improve the public’s ability to hold police, prosecutors, and the courts
accountable for the use—and misuse—of surveillance tools.
I.

THE RIGHT OF ACCESS IN THE ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE CONTEXT

Routine sealing of court records—including the court orders
authorizing electronic surveillance—implicates the public’s right of
access to judicial records and proceedings.32 So, too, do rules, practices,
and procedures that impede access without meeting the appropriate
common law and constitutional standards. While routine sealing in the
32. See In re Sealing & Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(d) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d 876, 886
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting “[a]n indefinite non-disclosure order is tantamount to a permanent
injunction of prior restraint” subject to the highest level of scrutiny).
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electronic surveillance context remains commonplace in district courts
throughout the nation, few litigants have challenged rules and practices
requiring secrecy by seeking to vindicate a right of access under either
the common law or the First Amendment.33 This Part briefly outlines the
contours of these two methods of ensuring access to judicial proceedings
and documents, and then explores how the First Amendment right of
access might be applied to electronic surveillance applications and
orders.
A.

The Common Law and Constitutional Right of Access to Judicial
Proceedings and Documents

In a series of cases during the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court
recognized public rights of access to court proceedings and documents
grounded in the Constitution and the common law. In 1978, the Supreme
Court found it “clear” that “the courts of this country recognize a general
right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents.”34 In Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc.,35 a group of broadcasters sought to obtain copies of twenty-two
hours of the Nixon White House tape recordings that had been played in
the courtroom during the Watergate trial.36 The Court recognized that the
recordings were precisely the type of “public records” to which a right of
access attaches.37
When a party seeks access to a judicial record under the common law,
the court is “faced with the task of weighing the interests advanced by
the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the courts.”38 On
the side of disclosure, the Nixon Court found that a “newspaper
publisher’s intention to publish information concerning the operation of
government” or “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the
workings of public agencies” were interests sufficient to support access
33. See, e.g., In re Petition of Jennifer Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn to Unseal Tech.-Assistance
Orders & Materials, No. 16-mc-80206-KAW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016) (seeking unsealing of
surveillance orders and applications under the First Amendment); United States v. Pen Register, No.
2:10-mj-01235 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2015) (intervening to unseal pen register application); In re The
Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & Orders, No. 13712 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2013) (seeking unsealing of pen register and trap and trace applications and
orders under the First Amendment).
34. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
35. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
36. Id. at 594.
37. Id. at 597.
38. Id. at 602.
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to judicial documents.39 Among the countervailing interests were the
disgraced President Nixon’s own property and privacy interests in the
recordings, as well as his desire that the tapes not be commercialized.40
The Nixon Court ultimately dodged the balancing inquiry by holding
that the Presidential Recordings Act provided an alternative for gaining
access to the records at issue in the case.41 It concluded, nonetheless, that
“any access scheme finally implemented” under the Act would still need
to satisfy statutory and constitutional requirements.42
As the balance of interests in the Nixon case suggests, the common
law presumption of access to judicial documents “can be overcome by a
competing, but not necessarily a constitutionally compelled, interest.”43
Likewise, courts “cannot craft federal common law when Congress has
spoken directly to the issue at hand.”44 As a result, a common law right
of access may be displaced or superseded by a statute that provides a
substitute disclosure scheme or advances a sufficiently weighty interest
in closure.45 For example, the D.C. Circuit has indicated that the
common law right of access to hearings and materials related to a grand
jury investigation, if any existed, would have been “supplanted” by Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.46
After Nixon, the Court recognized that the Constitution imposes an
even higher standard upon interference with the public’s right to attend
certain government proceedings. The First Amendment confers a public
right of access to a variety of criminal proceedings—including trials,47
voir dire,48 and preliminary hearings.49 Under the First Amendment, as

39. Id. at 597–99.
40. Id. at 601–02; see also United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317–21 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(articulating six factors for courts to weigh in considering whether to unseal judicial documents).
41. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603–07.
42. Id. at 607–08.
43. Lynn B. Oberlander, A First Amendment Right of Access to Affidavits in Support of Search
Warrants, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2216, 2217 (1990).
44. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the
rules related to the release of information under the Criminal Justice Act “occupy this field and
would supercede the common law right even if one existed”); see also MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability
Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the Dodd-Frank Act does not
“categorically bar disclosure by courts” of financial information in briefs and other court
documents).
46. In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
47. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
48. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
49. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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the Supreme Court recognized in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of
California (Press-Enterprise II),50 a court considering an access claim
must assess both “whether public access plays a significant positive role
in the functioning of the particular process in question” and “whether the
place and process have historically been open to the press and general
public.”51
If the First Amendment right attaches, the standard for closure is far
more demanding than under the common law: “[t]he presumption of
openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”52 This more robust standard
guides courts when they consider whether statutes limiting access
comply with the Constitution. Any statute that purports to supplant the
common-law right of access remains subject to the requirements of the
First Amendment if it limits the ability to view and inspect records or
proceedings to which the public has a constitutional right.
In fact, the First Amendment right of access evolved out of the close
relationship between judicial transparency, criminal justice, and
democratic oversight. In 1979, the Supreme Court—while holding that
the Sixth Amendment did not guarantee a public right of access to
criminal trials—indicated that there might be a right of access to
criminal trials couched in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.53 The
Court soon explicitly recognized the First Amendment right of access to
criminal trials, holding in Richmond Newspapers54 in 1980 that “the
right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people
have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and
of the press could be eviscerated.”55
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan identified “two helpful
principles” to cabin the application of the right of access.56 First,
Brennan emphasized the importance of history, writing that “the case for
a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information,”

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 8.
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391–92 (1979).
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Id. at 580 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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and that “what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a
particular government process is important in terms of that very
process.”57 Second, Brennan recognized that the right of access to
government proceedings served an important functional end as a critical
feature of the First Amendment’s “structural role . . . in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government.”58 Far from being
limited to criminal trials, Brennan wrote, the structural model of press
freedom stemmed from the right to gather information—and “the stretch
of this protection is theoretically endless.”59
In the 1982 Globe Newspaper case,60 the Court returned to Brennan’s
two-pronged approach, examining both the history of openness as well
as the positive results that transparency yields. The Court struck down a
Massachusetts law that “required the closure of sex-offense trials only
during the testimony of minor victims,”61 elaborating on the reasons that
access to criminal trials is so crucial. First, the Court found that the
historical “presumption of openness”62 was virtually uninterrupted, a fact
that “implies the favorable judgment of experience.”63 Second, public
access leads to positive outcomes, the Court wrote: “[p]ublic scrutiny of
a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
factfinding process . . . [and] fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby
heightening public respect for the judicial process.”64 Although the
Court recognized that the constitutional right of access to criminal trials
is “not absolute,” it held that when the government attempts to deny
access, “it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”65
Two years later, the Court expanded the constitutional right of access
from criminal trials to other judicial proceedings. In Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise I),66 the Court
held that the First Amendment guarantees the right to attend voir dire.67
Looking to the “presumptive openness of the jury selection process” in
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 588 (citing William J. Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979)).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 605.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 606.
Id. at 606–07.
464 U.S. 501 (1984).
Id.
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England both before and after the Norman Conquest, the Court
determined that “[p]ublic jury selection thus was the common practice in
America when the Constitution was adopted.”68 The public face of the
criminal justice process “gave assurance to those not attending trials that
others were able to observe the proceedings and enhanced public
confidence.”69
Based both on this historical experience as well as its apparently
positive outcome, the Court concluded, “[c]losed proceedings, although
not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that
outweighs the value of openness.”70 The Court emphasized that the
standard for closing proceedings was extraordinarily demanding: “[t]he
presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”71
Finally, in 1986, the Court considered whether a First Amendment
right of access attaches to preliminary hearings in criminal
prosecutions.72 Recognizing that the preceding decisions had
“emphasized two complementary considerations,”73 the Press-Enterprise
II Court articulated a two-prong test for whether the right of access
attaches to a particular proceeding. A court considering an access claim
must assess both “whether public access plays a significant positive role
in the functioning of the particular process in question” and “whether the
place and process have historically been open to the press and general
public.”74
None of these cases overtly restricted the First Amendment right of
access to judicial proceedings. Rather, in Press-Enterprise II, the Court
referred to “governmental processes.”75 And, indeed, appellate courts
have since found that the First Amendment right of access applies
broadly: to administrative proceedings,76 classified evidence in habeas
hearings brought by detainees at Guantánamo Bay,77 horse roundups,78
68. Id. at 508.
69. Id. at 507.
70. Id. at 509.
71. Id. at 510.
72. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).
77. Dhiab v. Obama, 70 F. Supp. 3d 486 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Dhiab v. Trump, 852
F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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and executions.79 While the constitutional right of access is expansive,
however, it is not limitless. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the
presumption of openness may be overcome based on a compelling
government interest, which “is to be articulated along with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure
order was properly entered.”80
B.

Closure and Surveillance

A variety of statutes regulate how the government can obtain content
and metadata from third-party service providers. The SCA permits the
government to apply for a court order requiring a communications
service provider to disclose either stored communications content (e.g.,
emails or messaging transcripts) or metadata (e.g., “to” and “from”
information).81 When the government seeks a search warrant for stored
communications, it must follow the procedures in Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs search warrant practice as a
general matter.82 The Pen/Trap Statute permits the government to apply
for a court order requiring a communications service provider to assist in
placing a pen register or trap and trace device on a communications line
to monitor metadata in real time.83 Lastly, the Wiretap Act, also known
as “Title III,” authorizes the government to seek an order to intercept
wire, oral, or electronic communications in real time.84
All three statutes include provisions that flout the norms of court
openness. The Pen/Trap Statute requires that an “order” should be
sealed,85 while Title III requires the sealing of applications and orders
78. Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2012).
79. Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
80. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). While the SCA does not always require law enforcement to get a
warrant for content, the Sixth Circuit and numerous lower courts have held that the Fourth
Amendment protects the content of emails. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir.
2010); see also JENNIFER R. HENRICHSEN & HANNAH BLOCH-WEHBA, ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE: WHAT JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS NEED
TO KNOW 5 n.18 (2017), https://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/SURVEILLANCE.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6AK5-CYFW].
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
83. Pen registers are devices that can record “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information” for outgoing communications, such as the phone numbers for outgoing calls. 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3). Trap and trace devices record the same information for incoming
communications. Id. § 3127(4).
84. Id. §§ 2510–2522.
85. Id. § 3123.
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(as well as any recordings made during the period of the wiretap).86
These sealing provisions direct courts to maintain the documents in a
manner that prevents the public, or other parties, from accessing them. In
contrast, neither the SCA nor Rule 41 includes any provisions
authorizing sealing of judicial records. Instead, both authorities include
provisions requiring notification of the affected individual as a general
rule, but permitting the government to delay notice if a court finds
“reason to believe” that notice “may have an adverse result.”87 In its
most recent report, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts tallies a
total of 14,801 applications for delayed notice search warrants, and
extensions thereof, in fiscal year 2015. 88 All but twenty-eight
applications were granted.89 Over 80% of the applications were issued in
connection with investigations of drug crimes.90
The SCA also permits the government to apply for a separate court
order “commanding” the recipient of an SCA warrant or subpoena not to
notify any person of the existence of the order.91 This “secrecy order”
provision requires that a court find “reason to believe that notification of
the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or court order will result in” one
of the enumerated harms.92
So-called “secrecy orders” are distinct from sealing provisions; they
are not instructions to courts, but rather restraints upon recipients—
private companies and individuals—that prevent them from speaking to
the public. Secrecy orders thus raise an additional First Amendment
concern, because they constitute prior restraints on the First Amendment
rights of the recipients, who may wish to speak about the orders they
have received.93 While the government does not disclose the number of

86. Id. § 2518.
87. Id. § 2705(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The enumerated “adverse result[s]” are the following:
“(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C)
destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise
seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.” Id. § 2705(a)(2).
88. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH
WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/20408/download [https://
perma.cc/5RHD-XMUQ].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Prior restraints are “administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.” Alexander v. United
States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).

Bloch-Wehba (Ready to Pub)

160

3/26/2018 11:06 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:145

secrecy orders sought each year,94 Microsoft, in recent litigation, has
claimed that it received over 3,250 secrecy orders over a twenty-month
period alone.95 In response to Microsoft’s lawsuit, the Department of
Justice recently adopted a new policy that will require each secrecy
order to have “an appropriate factual basis” and presumes that,
“[b]arring exceptional circumstances,” a secrecy order should last no
longer than one year.96
Table 1:
Surveillance Authorities and Sealing Provisions

Electronic
Search
Warrant
2703(d)
Order

Pen/Trap
Order
Title III
Order

Type of
information
sought
Communications
content, metadata,
and/or basic
subscriber and
session information
Communications
content (opened,
sent, or older than
180 days)
Basic subscriber
and session
information;
communications
metadata
Dialing, routing,
addressing, or
signaling
information
Communications
content

Notice provision

Gag
provision

No notice
required.
18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(b)(1)(A)

18 U.S.C.
§ 2705

Notice required,
but may be
delayed.

18 U.S.C.
§ 2705

No notice
required.
18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(3)

18 U.S.C.
§ 2705

No notice
required.

18 U.S.C.
§ 3123(d)

Notice required.
18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(8)(d)

18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(e)

94. See infra section III.D.
95. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgement at ¶ 5, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d. 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR), ECF No. 28.
96. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., POLICY REGARDING
APPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2705(B) (2017), https://www
.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/1005791/download [https://perma.cc/4VLZ-CXSE].
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Secrecy’s Widespread Impact

As a result of the sealing, non-disclosure, and delayed-notice
provisions codified in federal surveillance law, secrecy is now a
condition endemic to the federal courts.97 A 2009 study found that, in the
year 2006, over 15,000 sealed magistrate judge cases were filed, 83% of
which were “warrant-type applications.”98 Of the “warrant-type
applications,” 54% were search warrants, and 37% were applications for
pen registers, trap and traces, tracking devices, “and the like.”99 The
study suggests that in the year 2006, the government filed 7,486
applications in the federal courts for pen registers, trap and traces,
tracking devices, and other court orders compelling disclosure of
communications metadata—all of which were entirely secret.100 To put
this in perspective, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports
that in the twelve-month period ending in September 2006, magistrate
judges handled a total of 32,467 search warrants;101 the study reports that
some 7,400 sealed cases were search warrants.102 Over 22% of the
search warrants issued in 2006 were entirely sealed.103
Today, it appears that government is compelling companies to
disclose user information at rates never before seen. The Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts reports that federal magistrate judges
considered 72,960 applications for search warrants in the fiscal year
ending in September 2016, over twice as many as in 2007.104
Technology companies and communications providers now receive tens
97. See Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered, supra note 7.
98. FJC STUDY, supra note 3, at 21–22.
99. Id. at 22. In addition, 8,121 sealed “miscellaneous cases” were filed that year, 58% of which
were warrant-type applications. Id. at 23.
100. Id. at 21–22. It is possible that the FJC Study was in fact underinclusive, since the study
accounted only for cases that were entirely sealed, and did not analyze sealed documents in
unsealed cases. See id. at 1 (“We did not count as sealed cases those with every document sealed
and only highly redacted docket sheets available on PACER, because a method different from the
one we used would be necessary to find all such cases.”).
101. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS TABLE S-17, 2 (2006),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13538/download [https://perma.cc/2EK9-L7VT].
102. FJC Study, supra note 3, at 23.
103. This Article’s focus on federal courts is not meant to distract from similar issues facing state
courts. State courts may issue orders under the Pen/Trap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3122, and the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703. If anything, disparities in record-keeping and electronic
docketing practices in state courts make it even more difficult to investigate and uncover sealing
problems than in federal courts. Due to the lack of available data, however, the Article leaves for
another day discussion of sealing issues in state courts.
104. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS TABLE S-17 (2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/21849/download [https://perma.cc/HJ7U0AR8S].

Bloch-Wehba (Ready to Pub)

162

3/26/2018 11:06 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:145

of thousands of government demands each year: Verizon received over
21,000 search warrants in 2016.105 That number pales in comparison to
the number of warrantless requests demanding non-content information,
which far exceeds the number of search warrants.106 Facebook has
reported that approximately 57% of the tens of thousands of law
enforcement requests the company receives come with gag orders.107
2.

Secrecy in Judicial Administration

Local judicial rules compound prosecutorial habit and the secrecy
provisions in electronic surveillance statutes, giving rise to a system in
which the government routinely applies for electronic surveillance
orders in secret dockets, under complete seal. Given the overlapping and
inconsistent provisions in electronic surveillance statutes, it is perhaps
not surprising that district courts also exhibit inconsistencies in
docketing applications for electronic surveillance. For example, some
districts classify search warrants as “criminal,” others “miscellaneous,”
and still other districts as “magistrate” cases.108 In addition, “[t]hree
districts used ‘sw’ as a case type for search or seizure warrants,” and one
district used “pr” as a case type for pen registers.109
Many district courts have local rules that reflect a default presumption
of secrecy. Some districts provide for routine sealing of documents filed
in connection with applications for electronic surveillance.110 For
example, the District of Minnesota requires applications for electronic
surveillance to be made under seal and bars unsealing “except by court
order.”111 Broad default sealing requirements result in more documents
being filed under seal than requirements that the government apply for
individual court orders each time it seeks to seal information.
105. United States Report, VERIZON, http://vz.to/2lMOyb5 [https://perma.cc/M2KW-YXVA].
106. Id. (showing that Verizon received over 32,000 non-search warrant orders).
107. Transparency Report, FACEBOOK, https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20
States/2016-H2/ [https://perma.cc/VWF7-CYF8].
108. FJC Study, supra note 3, at 2.
109. Id. at 27.
110. D. D.C. CT. R. 49(e) (requiring that applications for electronic surveillance be filed under
seal, but not requiring a motion to seal); D. CONN. C.P.L.R. 57 (providing that orders authorizing a
pen register or trap and trace are filed in a “miscellaneous sealed case”). However, the Connecticut
rule differs for search warrant returns: “[u]nless otherwise directed by the Court for sufficient cause,
search warrant returns shall be docketed as unsealed filings.” Id.; see also Memorandum from
Andrew Udelsman & Yurij Melnyk, Media Freedom & Info. Access Clinic, to Janet C. Hall, Chief
Judge, D.D.C. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/mfia/document/
2017.04.27_ mfia_scrap_ct_letter_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R9B-AQLV].
111. D. MINN. L. R. 49.1.
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Electronically docketing surveillance materials also materially
improves the public’s practical ability to gain access to information, but
many districts nonetheless require surveillance applications to be filed
only in paper form. In the Eastern District of Virginia, District of
Columbia, and many other districts, search warrants and pen registers
are filed in paper and never made available electronically.112 Electronic
filing and docketing practices were adopted, not to facilitate access by
the public, but rather because improvements in cost and efficiency
offered “major gains for judges and court administrators.”113 Electronic
docketing, however, has also fundamentally changed researchers’ ability
to access court data.114 Jurisdictions that exempt surveillance orders
from electronic filing forego gains in efficiency as well as in public
accountability. Judicial districts that exempt electronic surveillance
documents from e-filing choose not to avail themselves of an automated
system reminding the government that it must meet an affirmative
obligation in order to maintain a record under seal. As a result, secret
orders may fly under the radar of the courts and the public.
District courts can also reduce the scope and extent of sealing if they
adopt default rules regarding judicial oversight or review of secrecy
requirements. Although electronic surveillance laws might require that
applications be filed under seal as an initial matter, they also anticipate
that secrecy need not last forever.115 Local rules also can trigger
mandatory action by the court or by prosecutors to review and, if
112. U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF VA., EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ELECTRONIC CASE
FILING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, CHAPTER THREE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 23
(2013),
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/ecf/documents/Chapter3-PoliciesandProcedureswithTitle
Page1-11-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT8V-FP6Y] (creating exception to e-filing rules for warranttype documents); see also U.S. DIST. COURT DIST. OF ARIZ., ELECTRONIC CASE FILING
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 23 (2016), http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/adm%20manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV7M-M2SX] (same); U.S.
DIST. COURT FOR S. DIST. OF CAL., ELECTRONIC CASE FILING ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES MANUAL 19 (2017), https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/CMECF/Lists/Policies%20
and%20Procedures/Attachments/8/CASDPolicies_01-20-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YVK5-7N7R]
(same); U.S. DIST. COURT S. DIST. OF TEX., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ELECTRONIC
FILING IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2007), http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/
admcvcrproc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K78-KHET] (same); C.D. CAL. L. CR. R. 49-1.2 (same); D.
D.C. CT. R. 49(e) (same).
113. Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 864 (2008).
114. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Research Access to Federal Court Data, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 2161, 2165 (2002) (writing that the U.S. Party/Case Index in an early version of PACER
was “of marginal value for research because one can enter only a single name at a time and get only
the name of the court and the number of the file”).
115. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (2012) (requiring sealing “until otherwise ordered by the
court”); id. at § 2705 (providing for delayed notice).
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necessary, either renew or remove sealing requirements later in time. For
example, the Eastern District of Missouri provides that applications for
search warrants are “received by the Court under temporary seal,” but
that continued secrecy requires a motion “establishing a compelling
interest necessitating a restriction on public access” within fourteen
days.116 Likewise, the Southern District of Alabama requires “[a]
publicly filed motion and order citing only the statutory authority for
sealing” for electronic surveillance orders, but it also provides that
sealed documents are to be unsealed after 120 days.117
It is intuitive that, as a practical matter, sunset provisions that create
an automatic, mandatory docket entry reminding the court that a docket,
application, or order is due to be unsealed are likely to result in more
unsealing than those that require action by the government or sua sponte
by the court. Sunset provisions that mandate routine unsealing of search
warrant returns and other sealed documents can greatly reduce the
number of judicial documents that remain secret in the long term.
An ongoing case provides an illustrative example of the obstacles to
gaining access to surveillance materials. Researchers in the Northern
District of California have alleged that that district maintains an entirely
sealed docket for applications and orders under the SCA and the
Pen/Trap Statute.118 The petitioners sought the docketing and unsealing
of court records related to matters arising under the Wiretap Act, the
SCA, and the Pen/Trap Statute.119 In response, the federal government
requested an opportunity to be heard because it “has an overarching
interest in enforcing federal law, including these confidentiality
provisions.”120 During oral argument on the petitioners’ motion, the
government notified the court that the United States Attorney’s Office
was “reviewing its own files to see what could be unsealed.”121 Months
later, the government has still not unsealed a single item from the
thousands of surveillance orders issued between 2006 and 2011 that the

116. E.D. MO. L.R. 83-13.05.
117. S.D. ALA. GEN. L.R 5.2.
118. Petition to Unseal Technical-Assistance Orders & Materials, In re Petition of Jennifer
Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn to Unseal Tech.-Assistance Orders & Materials, No. 16-mc-80206KAW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016), ECF No. 1.
119. Id.
120. United States’ Statement of Interest at 3, In re Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc80206-KAW (Oct. 13, 2016), ECF No. 6.
121. Order Denying Motion to Unseal Documents & Publicly Docket Court Records, In re
Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc-80206-KAW (June 23, 2017), ECF No. 36 [hereinafter
Order Denying Motion].
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prosecutors were reviewing.122 And without a functioning public docket,
petitioners cannot even identify—let alone move to unseal—individual
cases of interest.123
Notwithstanding these flaws, the court concluded that, while a
qualified right of access to electronic surveillance orders exists, it lacked
the authority to “reverse the sealing orders of other judges in this
district.”124 Moreover, the court determined that the petition was
overbroad because some of the surveillance orders may pertain to
investigations that were still active, and the petitioners had not identified
particular cases that were closed and could be unsealed.125 This finding
flouts the traditional rule that the government bears the burden to justify
closure, and ignores that the government’s ability to do so may well
erode over time.126 Moreover, the court’s position that its hands were
tied with regard to other cognate courts’ sealing orders ignores the
systemic issues raised by the petitioners concerning the problematic
docketing and sealing practices of the Northern District. The case is still
ongoing.127
The result of this ad-hoc, patchwork system is that district courts
around the country offer drastically different degrees of transparency
and accessibility with regard to judicial documents related to
surveillance. Even in districts where routine unsealing is the rule, local
practices may make it difficult to identify and locate dockets that include
electronic surveillance applications and orders. As a practical matter, the
inconsistency among the districts makes it difficult for the public to
understand either local or national patterns regarding electronic
surveillance—for example, whether a certain U.S. Attorney’s office
seeks pen registers at a rate that is far below the norm, or whether a
given judge does not require sealing orders in some types of cases. As a
legal matter, local rules and practices that permit sealing of electronic

122. Joint Status Report at 1, In re Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc-80206-KAW (Aug.
22, 2017), ECF No. 38 (“To date, no currently sealed criminal miscellaneous matters from that time
period have been determined to be suitable for unsealing.”).
123. Id. at 10 (“With little to no information available to us, how could Petitioners could [sic]
even learn of the existence of ‘particular historical matters’ to which we might wish to seek access,
much less ask the Court for access to them?”).
124. Order Denying Motion, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“[T]he
State’s justification in denying access must be a weighty one.”).
127. See Order Continuing Status Conference, In re Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc80206-KAW (June 23, 2017), ECF No. 45 (continuing status conference until March 2018).
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surveillance applications without either factual findings or provisions
regarding unsealing violate the First Amendment and the common law.
C.

Applying the Right of Access to Surveillance Records

The near-automatic application of secrecy requirements under the
Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA implicates two interrelated doctrinal
questions: how the First Amendment right of access should apply to
novel forms of proceedings, and whether the right attaches to documents
that were issued ex parte. Today, dozens of federal statutes appear to
require or authorize sealing of judicial documents as a rule, without any
analysis or findings by the court.128 These statutes, many of which were
enacted in the fairly recent past, raise questions about whether the
statutes impede access to documents to which the public has a
constitutional right of access.
Courts have taken two main approaches to resolving whether the First
Amendment right of access attaches to judicial records.129 The first,
“bifurcated” approach requires a litigant to establish both that the
records to which she seeks access have historically been open and that
transparency of those records serves a positive function.130 The second,
“complementary” approach finds that the right of access to documents
attaches when it is a “necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the
relevant proceedings.”131
Applying the first approach, courts have disagreed about how strictly
to enforce the historical prong of the First Amendment test, particularly
with regard to new proceedings. Courts following the strict historical
approach usually conclude that, without a lengthy tradition of access to
the particular proceeding at issue, no First Amendment right attaches.132
For example, in the only appellate decision considering whether the First
128. See Memorandum from Andrea Thomson to Dan Coquillette & Richard Marcus (Dec. 10,
2007) (on file with author).
129. In re New York Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401,
409 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We have previously endorsed two approaches to determine whether the First
Amendment right of access extends to particular judicial records.”).
130. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing the reasoning,
“adopted by some courts, that the Press-Enterprise II analysis requires both the experience and
logic prongs to be satisfied” (emphasis in original)).
131. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Doe v. Pub.
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the Pellegrino
approach).
132. See In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. ElSayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th
Cir. 1989)) (declining to decide whether to adopt the strict “two-prong” approach).
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Amendment right of access attaches to SCA orders, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that because of the SCA’s recent vintage, it could identify “no
long tradition of access specifically for § 2703(d) orders,” and the right
of access therefore did not apply.133 The D.C. Circuit has taken the same
approach in noting that “[t]here can hardly be a historical tradition of
access to the documents accompanying a procedure that did not exist”
until established by judicial decision in 1991.134
Courts that adhere to a strict historical approach ignore the serious
costs of allowing Congress to require secrecy in everyday judicial
proceedings. These rulings tacitly permit Congress to displace the right
of access merely by creating new, secret procedures—an endeavor that
raises concerns not only about constitutional rights, but also about the
separation of powers.135 This rigid approach also tends to ignore that—as
Judith Resnik has pointed out in the context of alternative dispute
resolution and arbitration—as statutory and technological change
“reshape ‘experiences,’ they alter the ‘logic’ of what courts are about
and when openness is therefore protected.”136
Other courts have found that it is appropriate to “de-emphasize
historical practices” if the proceeding or document in question is
novel.137 This variation of the bifurcated approach has been particularly
developed in the context of criminal pretrial proceedings such as
suppression hearings, which “have no historical counterpart.”138 Courts
adopting this approach have recognized that, at the time of the framing,
“no one could have conceived that the exclusionary rule and pretrial
motions to suppress evidence would be part of our criminal
jurisprudence.”139 Appellate courts have concluded that searching for
133. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d),
707 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
134. United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
135. See infra section II.A.
136. Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1816 (2014).
137. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 1983) (First
Amendment right of access attaches to pretrial hearing on motions to suppress and to change
venue); see also In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[L]ogic alone, even
without experience, may be enough to establish the right.”).
138. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 n.3 (1986).
139. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (Va. 1981) (quoting
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 395–96 (Burger, C.J., concurring)); see also United
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We do not think that historical analysis is
relevant in determining whether there is a first amendment right of access to pretrial criminal
proceedings.”); Iowa Freedom of Info. Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Iowa 1983)
(suppression hearings “are creatures unknown to traditional common law”).
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historical patterns of access to pretrial hearings is often in vain: “[t]he
most one could do is search for some pattern of access or non-access
which may have developed in the area,” but such a pattern may not
exist.140 Indeed, in some areas, a presumption of openness has developed
even in the absence of “centuries of tradition.”141 In light of the fact that
many pretrial hearings simply did not exist at common law, “the lack of
an historic tradition of open . . . hearings does not bar our recognizing a
right of access to such hearings.”142
To complicate matters further, some courts have adopted an
alternative method of applying the right of access to judicial records,
recognizing that the right of access to documents is a “necessary
corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings.”143 Rather
than asking whether there is a history and logic to openness of the
records themselves, this “complementary” approach asks whether the
documents are tied to a judicial proceeding which the public has a
constitutional right to attend.
But proceedings for the issuance of the orders are historically ex
parte.144 Although warrant affidavits and returns are typically filed with
the clerk after a search is executed, courts have concluded that that
practice is “not demanded by the [F]irst [A]mendment.”145 Moreover, it
certainly remains true that pretrial proceedings for the issuance of search
warrants or surveillance orders are “necessarily ex parte, since the
subject of the search cannot be tipped off to the application for a warrant
lest he destroy or remove evidence.”146
Courts that follow the “necessary corollary” approach would likely
reject a right of access to surveillance and warrant materials because

140. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998).
141. Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 465 A.2d 426, 431 (Md. 1983).
142. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363–64 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gannett, 443 U.S. at
401 (Powell, J., concurring)) (holding that a First Amendment right of access attaches to bail
reduction hearings, but that the right “extends no farther than the persons actually present at the time
the motion [for bail] is made”); see also Seattle Times Co. v. D. for the W.D. of Wash., 845 F.2d
1513, 1516 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a First Amendment right of access to pretrial release
proceedings).
143. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Doe v. Pub.
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the Pellegrino
approach).
144. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978)).
145. Id.
146. Franks, 438 U.S. at 169 (quoted in In re The Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir.
2012)).
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there is no contemporaneous right of access to the underlying ex parte
proceedings in which they are issued. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit relied on
the ex parte nature of warrant proceedings to reject an attempt by two
news organizations to gain access to search warrant materials filed under
seal.147 The newspapers argued that under Rule 41, the obligation to
deliver the executed warrant to the clerk is suggestive of a historical
practice of openness, as “once the search warrant documents are
returned to the clerk, they are routinely filed without seal.”148 The court,
however, found it “indisputable that proceedings for the issuance of
search warrants are not, and have not been, public.”149
Nevertheless, as Lynn Oberlander points out, several circuits have
extended the Press-Enterprise II holding to search warrant affidavits,
with mixed results.150 For example, in 1989 the Ninth Circuit held that
“members of the public have no right of access to search warrant
affidavits while a pre-indictment investigation is under way.”151 The
same year, the Fourth Circuit likewise rejected the Baltimore Sun’s
assertion of a “right of access to inspect and copy affidavits supporting
search warrants in the interval between execution of the warrants and
indictment.”152 Neither court considered whether a right of access may
attach after indictment or the resolution of an investigation.153 The
Eighth Circuit has concluded that the public has a First Amendment
right of access to search warrant affidavits even before an indictment
had issued.154 The disparate outcomes of applications for access to

147. In re The Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d at 428. The news organizations filed a preindictment motion for access to the search warrant materials, but by the time the court of appeals
ruled on the issue, an indictment had been issued. The court of appeals did not address the effect of
this procedural change, if any, upon the attachment of the First Amendment right.
148. Id. at 430.
149. Id. Although the court of appeals disagreed, the opinion also “reject[ed] the government’s
suggestion that there is no First Amendment right of access to the search warrant documents here
due to the fact that the search warrant application process is an investigative rather than a criminal
proceeding.” Id.
150. See Lynn B. Oberlander, A First Amendment Right of Access to Affidavits in Support of
Search Warrants, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2216, 2217 (1990).
151. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1989).
152. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989).
153. See also In re EyeCare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
EyeCare’s due process argument that it was entitled to the affidavits in support of the search warrant
executed on its property, “for no person affiliated with EyeCare has even been indicted, much less
deprived of life or liberty”).
154. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 575 (8th
Cir. 1988).

Bloch-Wehba (Ready to Pub)

170

3/26/2018 11:06 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:145

search warrant materials appear to depend at least partly on the status of
the investigation at the time of the request.155
Only the Fourth Circuit has explicitly considered whether a right of
access attaches to orders issued under the SCA.156 In In re Application of
the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d),157
the Fourth Circuit was presented with an order and application relevant
to the “pre-grand jury phase of an ongoing criminal investigation.”158 As
the district court in that case observed, “there is no history of openness
for documents related to an ongoing criminal investigation.”159 As a
result, the Fourth Circuit summarily concluded that § 2703(d) orders
“are most analogous to sealed or unexecuted search warrants and grand
jury proceedings for which traditionally, there is no history of access.”160
II.

A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SEARCHES

Even if the public has no right to attend proceedings at which search
warrants and surveillance orders are issued, public access to the related
materials might be a “necessary corollary” of a different proceeding: the
search itself. There is a rich and unexplored history of open access to
searches and seizures. During the framing generation and thereafter,
public observation of searches and seizures, in real time and space as

155. See In re The Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2012) (no First Amendment right of
access); In re EyeCare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d at 517 (holding that no right of access to search
warrant materials attaches under the Fourth Amendment); In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895
F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1990) (avoiding the constitutional question by finding a common law right
attaches); Goetz, 886 F.2d at 65 (finding that, while no right of access to search warrant materials
attaches under the First Amendment, notice was still required); Times Mirror Co., 873 F.2d at 1216
(“[T]he First Amendment does not establish a qualified right of access to search warrant
proceedings and materials while a pre-indictment investigation is still ongoing.”).
156. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 291–92 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that no First Amendment right of access
attaches to SCA orders); see also Craig Linder, Dow Jones Fights for Transparency, DOW
JONES (June 3, 2014), http://www.dowjones.com/press-room/dow-jones-fights-transparency/
[https://perma.cc/J2GJ-UX44] (finding that no First Amendment right attaches, and common law
does not require access).
157. 707 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2013).
158. Id. at 286.
159. In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 443 (E.D. Va. 2011).
160. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d),
707 F.3d at 292 n.9. But see In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications &
Orders, No. 13-MC-00712, 2018 WL 1129660, at *14 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2018) (“[N]one of the
materials to which the petitioners seek access—not even SCA warrants—are analogous to
traditional search warrants.”).
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well as in the press, fostered criticism, debate, and resistance to abuses
of power that were then proscribed in the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment grew out of a general consensus in the
Framing generation against general, warrantless, and abusive searches of
homes and private places.161 The two clauses of the Amendment—the
first ensuring the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
the second proscribing the issuance of warrants except “upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”—evinced
the Framers’ reaction to two types of abuses suffered for centuries under
British rule.162
A full accounting of the contested history and historiography of the
framing of the Fourth Amendment is far beyond the scope of this
Article.163 Indeed, the hotly disputed questions surrounding the framing
of the Fourth Amendment—the relationship between the two clauses of
the Amendment, the historical understanding of the terms
“unreasonable” and “probable cause,” and the Framers’ intentions
regarding the scope of the Amendment—only tangentially abut this
Article’s main claims. Instead, this Part demonstrates that, far from
being insulated from public view, searches and seizures were
quintessentially public proceedings, and their very openness laid bare
abuses of power that required democratic oversight. It was the invention
of warrantless policing, in lockstep with technological change, that
facilitated secrecy.

161. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67,
70.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
163. See generally WILLIAM CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING lxvi (2009) (“Many kinds of searches and seizures were unreasonable within the original
meaning of the amendment, not just general warrants.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (arguing, generally, that the Fourth Amendment
was intended to require reasonableness, not warrants); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 398 (1974) (arguing that the effort to reconstruct Fourth
Amendment history is “illusory”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (2000) (“[T]he Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at all in
the Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state provisions; thus, they never anticipated that
‘unreasonable’ might be read as a standard for warrantless intrusions.”); Tracey Maclin & Julia
Mirabella, Framing the Fourth, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1049 (2011) (placing Cuddihy’s contribution in
the context of scholarly debates between Amar, Davies, and others); Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 825 (1994) (“[I]t is perfectly appropriate
for twentieth-century judges to forge a new connection between reasonableness and warrants and to
create a new constitutional remedy in light of our post-colonial history.”).
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Searches as “Public Spectacle”

When the Framers demanded that searches be reasonable and that
warrants be limited in scope, they were responding to the common law
legacy of unfettered power of discretionary searches.164 These concerns
were tangible: the “harsh experience of householders having their doors
hammered open by magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown”
gave rise to the principles set forth in the Fourth Amendment that limited
the government’s ability to search.165 The “sacrosanct interest” in
privacy in the home required heightened protections from searches.166 A
vivid 1788 commentary called on readers to “imagine the dreadful giant
Congress storming our domestic castles by warrants both general and
special, and searching our cellars, garrets, bed-chambers and closets,”
admonishing them not to be “such gentle doves as to let any cormorants
rifle your nests, snatch the victuals from your little ones, and tear the
covers from your beloved mates.”167 “Open your front door, ran the
argument, and the extent of federal invasion will be infinite. Kitchens
and closets, cellars and garrets, bedchambers and trunks, desks and
letters, petticoats, and pockets: none will remain inviolate to scrutiny.”168
The 1766 “Malcom affair,” which one scholar has called “the most
famous search in colonial America,” exemplified the type of domestic
intrusion that the Framers wished to prevent.169 On the authority of a
writ of assistance issued a year prior, two customs officers entered
Malcom’s house to search for smuggled brandy and liquor. Despite
claiming innocence, Malcom “opened every place in his house that his
visitors wished to see, including his wood shed and two cellars.”170
When Malcom refused the officers’ demand that Malcom open a third
cellar compartment, the customs officers called in reinforcements to
break in: Malcom then armed himself with pistols and a sword and
threatened to kill the searchers.171 The searchers left, then returned with

164. Davies, supra note 163, at 578 (“Common-law authorities repeatedly gave a consistent
reason for condemning general warrants: if such warrants had been permitted, they would have
conferred on ordinary officers discretionary authority to arrest or even to search houses.”).
165. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372 (1980).
166. Davies, supra note 163, at 642.
167. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 679.
168. Id. at 766.
169. Id. at 496.
170. Id. at 497.
171. Id.
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a specific search warrant, only to find that Malcom had fortified his
house, locking “every window, door, and gate.”172 The customs officers
began calling upon bystanders to help them break in, but to no avail.173
“Many in the crowd sympathized with Malcom and angrily refused to
help; others were willing to assist only after he had been subdued.”174
The Malcom affair also illustrates another critical aspect of searches
in the colonial era: they occurred in public, in real time and space.
Indeed, it was precisely the public nature of the Malcom search, the sight
of the customs officers bellowing at Malcom’s home-turned-castle, that
attracted scrutiny and resistance from passersby who refused to help.
Likewise, legislators in the colonial era were hostile to other measures
that would tend to expedite searches and insulate them from public view,
repudiating nocturnal searches and no-knock entry.175 These limitations
on the power to search ensured not only that individuals were protected
from unlawful, abusive searches, but also that searches were executed in
daylight, perhaps with neighbors and curious bystanders watching. The
very public nature of searches and seizures, coupled with the abusive
practice of general and discretionary searches, fostered the population’s
distrust, antipathy, and ultimately obstruction of colonial officers who
undertook them: “[t]arred and feathered customs officers, cowed
magistrates, and mob ‘liberations’ of seizures flooded newspapers and
correspondence.”176
Searches were transparent in another way: after a search was
completed and property seized, an inventory was required to be left with
the individual searched.177 In the seminal case of Wilkes v. Wood,178 a
dissenting printer filed an action for trespass after the government
searched and seized all of his papers; a chief objection to the
unreasonableness of the blanket search was that the searchers had failed

172. Id. at 498.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 499. In the wake of the Malcom affair, Sir Francis Bernard, Governor of
Massachusetts, sent depositions to England to “remind Westminster yet again of Boston’s
incorrigible turbulence”—and to prompt Parliament to enact statutory permission for writs of
assistance searches in the colonies. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 447–54 (1978).
175. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 660–61.
176. Id. at 511.
177. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th
Cir. 1988) (“[A]lthough the process of issuing search warrants has traditionally not been conducted
in an open fashion, search warrant applications and receipts are routinely filed with the clerk of
court without seal.”). This requirement is mirrored in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.
178. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489.
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to leave an inventory behind.179 At a minimum, the logic ran, the
government had to inform the target of a search and seizure of what had
been taken. During the founding era, however, executed warrants were
“retained by the constable,” not filed with a central clerk’s office for all
to see.180
The law of search and seizure was also itself made public: William
Cuddihy reports that, in the wake of the revolution, “practically all”
legislation restricting searches and seizures was published, making the
“major developments in search and seizure readily accessible.”181 Yet
these publications provoked scant response from the public, a fact that
Cuddihy attributes, in part, to the traumatic effects of plunder during the
war: “[w]hen heavily armed men kicked in the door in the dead of night
and demanded to be fed, the persons behind that door reacted with terror
and outrage, not with arguments for specific search warrants or
evaluations of probable cause.”182
Given this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that the framers of
the Fourth Amendment retained a deeply physical, place-based
conception of what ought to be protected from the unfettered, general
power to search homes and seize property. In order to prevent law
enforcement from using general warrants, the framers chose to require a
warrant to specify the “place” to be searched.183 Spatial limits were
integral to the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on the power to search
and seize.
Yet the framing generation also recognized that physical searches
implicated ephemeral ideas. In crying out for protection from unfettered
home searches, commentators “expressed concern for ‘the most delicate
parts of our families,’ for ‘most discreet recesses,’ ‘private papers,’ and
‘private concerns,’ in short, for privacy.”184 The special protections from

179. Id. at 498 (“The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons houses, break
open escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the
things thus taken away, and where no offenders names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a
discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall.”).
180. Davies, supra note 163, at 642 n.257.
181. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 666.
182. Id. at 667.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Cuddihy observes that the contemporary definition of “place” was a
“particular portion of space,” concluding that by limiting warrants to one “place,” Congress
intended to “restrict the resulting search not only to a single building, but, if possible, to a segment
of it or to a unique area of space, even if it did not constitute a fully enclosed structure.” CUDDIHY,
supra note 163, at 742.
184. Id. at 766; see also Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 397 (2008)
(quoting Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
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search that the Framers conferred upon “papers” also emanated partly
from the English history of using search and seizure to control religious
and political dissent.185 William Stuntz also emphasizes the historical
salience of the seditious libel cases of Entick v. Carrington186 and
Wilkes, two “classic First Amendment cases in a system with no First
Amendment.”187 In short, the Fourth Amendment was rooted in the
public backlash to abusive, discretionary physical searches of homes and
private places, but was equally intended to protect against invasion of
the intangible interests of privacy and expressive and religious freedom
as against physical intrusions.
B.

Secrecy, Compulsion, and Coercion Under the Fourth Amendment

The presumption that searches were public, and publicly accountable,
continued into the nineteenth century. Most early Fourth Amendment
cases continued to involve open, physical searches, not secret ones. As a
result, the early doctrine tended to emphasize how the government’s use
of force and compulsion—factors that were tangible to those who were
searched—rendered home searches unreasonable. For example, in Boyd
v. United States,188 the Court distinguished between the “search and
seizure of a man’s private papers, or the compulsory production of them,
for the purpose of using them in evidence against him in a criminal
case,” and the search and seizure of goods that were contraband.189 The
Boyd Court did not contemplate a secret search, but a compelled
disclosure of papers; accordingly, it found that “any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers
to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,” is
prohibited by the Constitution.190
In two later cases, the Court rejected secret, warrantless searches,
even when they involved no outright force or overt compulsion. In 1914,
(1928) (the Framers “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations”)).
185. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 55–60 (detailing how English monarchs targeted “seditious”
and “heretical” religious books and manuscripts for searches and seizures after the Reformation and
the Restoration and well into the mid-seventeenth century).
186. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029.
187. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 403
(1995). But see Davies, supra note 163, at 573 n.57 (claiming that Stuntz erred in concluding that
search warrants at the framing were rare).
188. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
189. Id. at 623.
190. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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the Court considered in Weeks v. United States191 a physical search of a
suspect’s home while he was absent.192 The defendant had been arrested
at the train station where he worked. While he was under arrest, the
police went to his house, located—with a neighbor’s assistance—the
spare key, and let themselves in to seize some of his books and papers.193
Later that day, the police returned with the marshal; a neighbor let them
in and they searched again.194 The defendant petitioned for the return of
his property, and the Court refused to sanction the search, holding, by
implication, that a court has no authority “to retain for the purposes of
evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused, seized in his
house in his absence and without his authority, by a United States
Marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none for the search of his
premises.”195
In Gouled v. United States,196 the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized that “the secret taking or abstraction, without force, . . . of a
paper writing of evidential value only belonging to one suspected of a
crime and from the house or office of such a person” constituted a
Fourth Amendment “search.”197 Gouled involved a conspiracy to
defraud the United States through contracts for the provision of clothing
and equipment.198 Suspicious of dishonest conduct, the “Intelligence
Department” of the U.S. Army asked Cohen, who was both a private in
the Department and a business acquaintance of Gouled’s, to
investigate.199 Pretending to pay a “friendly call,” Cohen stole several
documents from Gouled’s office in his absence.200 Six months later,
agents of the Department of Justice secured warrants permitting them to
search Gouled’s office for “letters, papers, documents, and writings”
relating to the conspiracy.201 Gouled was aware of the warrants, but

191. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
192. Id. at 386.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 393 (emphasis added). Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States also presented a
situation in which the defendants’ office was searched in their absence and without a warrant while
they were detained in custody, and the Court once again rebuked the government. 251 U.S. 385
(1920).
196. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
197. Id. at 305, abrogated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 304.
199. Gouled v. United States, 264 F. 839, 839 (2d Cir. 1920).
200. Id. at 839.
201. Id. at 840.

Bloch-Wehba (Ready to Pub)

2018]

3/26/2018 11:06 AM

EXPOSING SECRET SEARCHES

177

according to the Second Circuit, which certified the question to the
Supreme Court, “Gouled did not know what Cohen had done” until
Cohen testified before the grand jury.202
Once again, the Court rejected the notion that “[e]ither actual force or
legal compulsion” were necessary ingredients for an unconstitutional
search.203 Recognizing that forcible entry would render a resulting
search unreasonable, the Court reasoned that “it is impossible to
successfully contend that a like search and seizure would be a reasonable
one if only admission were obtained by stealth instead of by force or
coercion.”204 The owner’s “security and privacy” would be “as much
invaded” in both cases, the Court found, and held that whether law
enforcement enters a home or office “by stealth, or through social
acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call, and whether the owner
be present or not when he enters, any search and seizure subsequently
and secretly made in his absence” is proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment.205
C.

Eavesdropping and Wiretapping

The development of wiretapping and eavesdropping weakened the
Court’s resolve that secret searches were equally off-limits as forcible
ones. In 1928, the Olmstead Court held that eavesdropping on telephone
conversations, without a physical trespass, implicated no Fourth
Amendment rights. Recharacterizing the “stealthy entrance” in Gouled
as “the equivalent to an entry by force,” the Court rejected the idea that
the Fourth Amendment could also be violated in intangible ways,
dismissing the eavesdropping as representative “only of voluntary
conversations secretly overheard.”206 The Gouled decision, the Court
said, represented the “extreme limit” of the Fourth Amendment.207
In dissent, Justice Brandeis recognized that new technology made
secret searches as easy to accomplish as those achieved by force or
compulsion. Just so, Justice Brandeis argued that the government’s
possession of “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means” of searching and

202. Id.
203. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 299.
204. Id. at 305.
205. Id. at 306.
206. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463–64 (1928). The Court appeared to shy away
from the “sweeping” results of Weeks and its progeny, which had resulted in the outright exclusion
of evidence from criminal proceedings rather than the imposition of ex post liability. Id. at 463.
207. Id.
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seizing made the Court’s focus on tangible harms irrelevant; government
agents need no longer resort to “stretching upon the rack.”208
Nor did Justice Brandeis accept the Court’s assertion that only visible,
tangible searches warranted constitutional protections, instead quoting
the dissenting opinion from the Ninth Circuit: “[t]rue the one is visible,
the other invisible; the one is tangible, the other intangible; the one is
sealed, and the other unsealed; but these are distinctions without a
difference.”209
Following Olmstead, Congress recognized that even warrantless,
secret, and—in some sense—intangible surveillance of conversations
implicated civil liberties. In the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
Congress prohibited law enforcement from wiretapping conversations.210
But that statutory prohibition was frequently ignored; indeed, the
Department of Justice interpreted the Act to permit interception, “so
long as no disclosure of the content outside the Department is made.”211
From 1928 until 1967, in other words, no warrant or judicial order was
required for electronic surveillance. As a result, during that period law
enforcement operated in the dark, almost entirely without oversight by
the courts or the public.212
D.

“Necessarily Secret” Electronic Searches Emerge

In the 1960s, the Court began once again to shift its approach to the
constitutional problems raised by secret, warrantless communications
surveillance. In Berger, the Court found fault with the New York
eavesdropping statute’s failure to provide for notice to the target of a
wiretap, even as the majority conceded that the statute’s “success
depends on secrecy.”213 Subsequently, the Court overtly repudiated the
“trespass-based” theory of the Fourth Amendment in its 1967 ruling in
Katz v. United States214 and held that electronic surveillance, in the
absence of physical trespass, still constituted a “search.”215
208. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 475.
210. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56
ALA. L. REV. 9, 26 (2004).
211. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 127 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
212. Freiwald, supra note 210, at 26.
213. Berger, 388 U.S. at 60. In dissent, Justice Black lambasted the majority’s “notice”
requirement as a “fantastic suggestion” that was fundamentally at odds with the fact that “secrecy is
an essential, indeed a definitional, element of eavesdropping.” Id. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting).
214. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
215. Id. at 353.
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In recognizing that the Fourth Amendment attaches to telephonic
communications, the Court nonetheless distinguished eavesdropping
from physical searches, finding that judicially “authorized electronic
surveillance” required no prior notice.216 The Court rejected the Fourth
Amendment’s “knock and announce” requirement as inapplicable to
eavesdropping, just as “officers need not announce their purpose before
conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement
would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical
evidence.”217 Katz ushered in a new era of judicially sanctioned secret
searches that had previously been unregulated, bringing wiretapping and
electronic surveillance under the supervision of magistrates.
In response to Katz and Berger, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in
1968. The Act “[w]ork[ed] from the hypothesis that any wiretapping and
electronic surveillance legislation” should respond to the concerns raised
in Katz and Berger, including the requirement of notice to targets.218 The
Department of Justice recognized that Berger and Katz “established that
notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications,”219
but that prior notice was impracticable in the electronic surveillance
context. Because ex post notice was likewise required under “existing
search warrant practice[s],” Congress substituted a requirement that law
enforcement serve an inventory on the target of a wiretap after the
interception.220 Conceding that, under certain circumstances, the
government might be able to postpone notice “almost indefinitely,” the
Senate nonetheless embraced the principle that subjects of surveillance
would be informed, after the fact, that their communications had been
intercepted.221 This “principle of postuse notice,” the Senate noted, not
only guaranteed that surveillance “must eventually become known at
least to the subject,” but also performed an important public oversight
function to “insure the community that the techniques are reasonably
employed.”222
The Wiretap Act also, however, codified a presumption of secrecy.
This requirement stemmed from the same reasons eavesdropping
warranted careful judicial oversight: it was intrusive. The Act set out

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 355 n.16 (1967).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 1097, at 2163 (1968).
114 CONG. REC. 6214 (May 23, 1968) (emphasis in original).
S. REP. NO. 1097, at 2194.
Id.
Id.
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explicit requirements for applications to intercept communications and
provided that applications made, orders granted, and recordings
authorized under the act “shall be sealed by the judge” and disclosed
“only upon a showing of good cause.”223
While Katz expanded the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court simultaneously broadened law enforcement’s power to search by
dismantling the “mere evidence” rule, which had historically limited law
enforcement’s ability to search for evidence unless it constituted an
instrumentality, fruit of crime, or contraband.224 In Warden v. Hayden,225
only six months prior to Katz, the Court had repudiated that
longstanding distinction, upholding the admission of a defendant’s “cap,
jacket, and trousers” as evidence in his trial for robbery. 226 This rejection
of the “mere evidence” rule laid the groundwork for police to search for
evidence of crime, even when it is “in the private files of a person not
suspected of involvement in any criminal activity.”227
Subsequently, the Court adopted the rule that an individual can have
“no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.”228 In 1976, the Court held in United States v.
Miller229 that a bank customer had no expectation of privacy, and thus no
Fourth Amendment protection, regarding depositor records held by his
bank.230 The defendant in Miller not only lacked a legal right to
challenge a subpoena issued to a third party, but also was not entitled to
notice of that subpoena. In dissent, Justice Brennan characterized this
lack of notice as a “fatal constitutional defect.”231
The implications for telephone records were immediate. Two years
after Miller, the D.C. Circuit held that reporters were not entitled to

223. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1968); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 211 (2013) (“To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the
interception of wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has
consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent
jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court.”).
224. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967).
225. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
226. Id. at 296.
227. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442–44 (1976)).
229. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
230. Id. at 442–43.
231. Id. at 448 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735,
743 (1984) (precedent “disable[s] respondents from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third
parties is necessary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional search or seizure of his papers”).
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notice before subpoenas were issued for telephone records reflecting
communications with sources.232 The following year, the Supreme Court
held in Smith v. Maryland233 that no search warrant was required for pen
registers because, regardless of whether the petitioner wished to keep the
“contents” of his conversations private, he had no expectation of privacy
in the phone numbers he dialed.234
Taken together, Katz, Hayden, and the third-party doctrine
substantially altered the constitutional protections against unfettered law
enforcement access to telecommunications records. Katz made it
possible for law enforcement to obtain search warrants in order to listen
in on conversations. Hayden legitimized the use of searches that targeted
even those not suspected of committing a crime. And Smith and Miller
made plain that targets were not entitled to notice of the electronic
surveillance that was occurring. None of these cases took account of the
important functions that notice performed by keeping the government
accountable in criminal investigations, both to defendants and to the
public.
E.

Statutory Secrecy Provisions in the Third-Party Context

In 1986, when Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA), it reformed Title III and regulated the new kinds of
electronic surveillance occurring under the third-party doctrine. While
the Wiretap Act regulated real-time acquisition of communications
content, the Pen/Trap Statute regulated real-time acquisition of
communications metadata using pen registers, trap and trace devices,
and tracking devices.235 As the name suggests, the SCA regulated
government acquisition of communications in storage, including both
content and metadata.236 All three authorities set out frameworks for the
government to apply for court orders authorizing the acquisition of
electronic communications information from service providers.
Like the Wiretap Act, the Pen/Trap Statute codified secrecy
requirements, albeit with unclear congressional motivations. The 1985
232. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1044 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (“[A] person has no Fourth Amendment basis for challenging subpoenas directed at the
business records of a third party, and, hence, has no right to notice of such subpoenas.”).
233. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
234. Id. at 743–44 (emphasis in original).
235. The USA PATRIOT Act amended the Pen/Trap Statute to clarify that the government could
use this authority to collect “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information” of “electronic
communication[s].” See Susan Freiwald, supra note 210, at 49.
236. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
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versions of the bill from the House and the Senate were silent on judicial
sealing requirements and provided that “the person owning or leasing the
line” affected by the pen register may be able to disclose the existence of
the order “60 days after its removal.”237 In addition, the Act provided
that the judge who issued the order should notify the affected person
within ninety days after the termination of a pen register.238 In the final
version, however, these provisions were absent; instead, Congress
required that an order be sealed and the recipient gagged “until
otherwise ordered by the court.”239
At the same time that Congress adopted these secrecy requirements
for electronic searches, the Fourth Amendment presumption against
secret physical searches remained intact.240 Even when the government
executed “sneak and peek” warrants, which permit agents to enter a
premises to gather information without leaving notice or an inventory, it
was required to give advance or contemporaneous notice to the target of
the search unless it demonstrates “reasonable necessity for the delay.”241
Even if notice might be delayed, sneak and peek warrants required
“notice of the search within a reasonable time after the covert entry.”242
These safeguards were necessary because, as the Ninth Circuit put it,
“surreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very heart
of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”243
In contrast, by substituting gag orders for notice requirements in the
electronic context, Congress created a norm of secrecy without historical
precedent. Although, as the Court recognized in Berger and Katz,
electronic surveillance did not require prior or contemporaneous notice,
ex post notice was still required. And in enacting the Wiretap Act,
Congress recognized that “postuse notice” performed not only essential
due process functions, but also served to keep the government
accountable to the public. By contrast, the enactment of the Pen/Trap
Statute included neither provisions for notice to targets nor for public
accountability. The result was that the new third-party ecosystem

237. H.R. 3378, 90th Cong. § 3123 (1985).
238. Id.
239. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (2010).
240. John Kent Walker, Jr., Covert Searches, 39 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554 (1987) (arguing that the
extension of the warrant requirement to electronic surveillance represented a shift toward protection
of privacy from protection of property).
241. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).
242. Id.
243. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
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dramatically departed from the longstanding historical tradition of open,
publicly accountable searches and seizures.244
F.

First Amendment Implications of Fourth Amendment History

This Fourth Amendment story has deep implications for how we
understand the historical inquiry through the prism of the First
Amendment right of access. The First Amendment requires courts to
dive deep to understand whether a certain type of document or
proceeding was historically open. But the historical experience of
openness for search warrants, and the recognition of the importance of
transparency and notice in the electronic surveillance context, suggest
several different appropriate avenues for inquiry.
First, the experience of open, public searches at common law and
long thereafter might suggest that searches and seizures are themselves
“government proceedings” subject to a First Amendment right of access.
Courts have recognized a historical tradition of public access to
government proceedings that are “open to all comers” or are “fully open
events.”245 The broad experience of public oversight, observation, and
participation in searches and seizures strongly suggests that there is a
long tradition of openness. Indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court
addressed secret searches at all, it appeared to find them constitutionally
dubious—that is, until technological change created a need for secrecy
by facilitating eavesdropping, wiretapping, and other electronic
surveillance.
Second, a history of closure that results from a statutory bar on
openness does not, in and of itself, suggest that closure is either
normatively desirable or constitutional. The fact that a statute permits or
requires closure does not necessarily reflect a congressional belief that
closure is either “consistent with historical practice or a significant
departure.”246 As a result, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that looking to
a history of closure that results from a statutory authorization of secrecy

244. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 802–03
(1994) (contrasting secret electronic surveillance, without notice, with physical warrants that
“would be served on the owner or occupant of the searched premises, or left there, giving the target
clear notice of what had been searched or seized, and when”).
245. Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing
executions as historically open).
246. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
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is “obviously not required (and perhaps entirely inappropriate) as part of
the ‘experience’ factor of Press-Enterprise II.”247
It follows that courts ought to scrutinize the statutory sealing and
secrecy requirements in the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA, which
purport to justify secrecy where it appears that in fact none was intended
or required. The Supreme Court had recognized, in Berger and Katz, that
while electronic searches necessarily had to take place in secret, ex post
notice was an essential element of preventing government abuses.
Likewise, in enacting the Wiretap Act, Congress had found that “postuse
notice” served to keep the public informed of government activity.
Against this background, the enactment of broad secrecy provisions in
1986 appears historically unfounded, and the legislative history offers no
explanation.
Finally, a history of closure, by itself, cannot suggest that closure is
constitutionally proper. The history of electronic surveillance orders
from the 1986 enactment of the ECPA until the present is largely one of
secrecy created by legislation, not evidence of a long history of
justifiable closure. And, indeed, the prevalence of secrecy actually itself
impedes the historical analysis; so few courts have ruled on the record
about the propriety of sealing electronic surveillance orders that the
historical record is quite thin.248 Against this background, it is equally
likely that closure reflects law enforcement’s propensity toward
secrecy.249 Although a “tradition of accessibility implies the favorable
judgment of experience,”250 the inverse is not necessarily true.
III. THE LOGIC OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
SURVEILLANCE
The second element of the Press-Enterprise II framework requires
consideration of “whether public access plays a significant positive role

247. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 915, 925 (Va. 1981) (finding that a facially-valid
statute authorizing closure may be constitutional on its face, but “[u]nless the standard for closure
previously discussed has been established in accordance with” adequate procedures, it would be
unconstitutional as applied).
248. See In re Sealing & Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(d) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d 876, 887
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (“No court has yet considered whether electronic surveillance orders fall within
the ambit of the First Amendment’s right of public access.”).
249. In re The Search of Fair Fin. v. United States, 692 F.3d 424, 431 (“[W]e do not interpret the
fact that the government may in some instances allow documents filed after the execution of the
search warrant to become public to be evidence of an historical tradition of accessibility to them.”).
250. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980).
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in the functioning of the particular process in question.”251 Transparency
as a proposed remedy for law enforcement misconduct is not new.
Access to documents filed in connection with applications for electronic
surveillance plays a positive role by facilitating public understanding of
surveillance law and technology, holding law enforcement and
prosecutors accountable for uses and abuses of surveillance tools and
methods, and making available to the public basic data about the
frequency with which police use surveillance authorities.
A.

Awareness of Surveillance Technology

Secret surveillance techniques sometimes provide the linchpin of
investigations. As police acquire and test out new surveillance
techniques, “disclosure of a search performed in one criminal case risks
exposing the new technique writ large, both to other targets of similar
investigations but also to the public generally.”252 This is a legitimate
concern, but a narrow one: it may be the case that the police have a
compelling interest in maintaining secrecy with regard to some
surveillance techniques, but it is deeply implausible that every pen
register deserves eternal protection from public view.253 Moreover,
recognizing that court orders are public documents does not require
police to lay bare their complete arsenal; they may continue to keep from
public view sensitive tools and techniques that they may use without
judicial approval.254 Others might see this as an example of just the sort
of illegitimate “police exceptionalism” that fails to treat police “as the
executive officials they are, subject to the same basic requisites of
democracy—namely, transparent, publicly accountable, ex ante
regulation.”255
Transparency is doubly important in the surveillance context because
warrantless requests to service providers frequently implicate novel
technologies and legal theories. In 2005, the federal government sought
an order under the SCA in the Eastern District of New York that would
permit the ongoing, prospective disclosure of cell site location

251. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
252. Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 895.
253. Cf. Joint Status Report, supra note 122.
254. But see Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1595 (2016) (discussing how federal procurement circumvents local accountability and oversight
mechanisms for police surveillance).
255. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 23, at 1833.
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information.256 Magistrate Judge Orenstein demurred, concluding that
the government may not lawfully obtain an order authorizing the
prospective acquisition of location information unless it demonstrates
probable cause.257 As Judge Orenstein explained, the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) explicitly barred
telecommunications carriers from including location information
pursuant to pen register and trap and trace authority.258 Judge Orenstein
rejected the government’s proposal that it could fuse the statutory
authority to conduct prospective surveillance under the Pen/Trap Statute
with its authority to collect historical cell site location information under
the SCA without impermissibly flouting CALEA.
The same year, across the East River, Magistrate Judge Gorenstein
issued an opinion authorizing precisely the relief that Judge Orenstein
had declined to grant.259 Law enforcement’s “hybrid theory,” which
marries the statutory authority to obtain location information under the
SCA with the authority to obtain prospective information under the
Pen/Trap Statute, created a split among courts.260
The so-called “encryption debate” raises additional questions
regarding the government’s interpretation of its authority to compel
assistance under the Pen/Trap Statute. In 2013, the government obtained
an order requiring Lavabit, an encrypted email provider, to place a
pen/trap device on its system to capture incoming and outgoing traffic
on an encrypted email account; Lavabit claimed it could not comply and
refused to produce its SSL keys, even after the government obtained a
search warrant.261 Eventually, Lavabit permitted the government to
install the pen/trap device it sought, “[b]ut, without the encryption keys,
much of the information transmitted to and from Lavabit’s servers
256. In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), on
reconsideration sub nom. In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the
Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or
Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). In the alternative, the government sought the
same information under the Pen/Trap Statute.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 565.
259. In re Application of United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records &
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that a decision that proposed relief was precluded by statute “would constitute a directive
that cell site information was not obtainable by any mechanism at all”).
260. See Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 336 (2011);
Timothy Stapleton, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell Location Data: Is the
Whole More than the Sum of Its Parts?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 408 (2007) (discussing split
between Orenstein and Gorenstein opinions).
261. In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2014).
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remained encrypted, indecipherable, and useless.”262 The government
explicitly sought to “avoid litigating the issue” of whether Lavabit was
required to turn over its keys under the Pen/Trap Statute’s provision
requiring “technical assistance.”263 To date, that question has not been
resolved in a public ruling.
The Lavabit example illustrates the urgent need to understand how the
Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA apply to encrypted communications
services that—by design—cannot provide detailed information about
customers or usage. In two recent drug distribution cases, the
government has obtained orders authorizing the installation of a pen/trap
device to capture call and messaging details from WhatsApp, a
messaging app that uses internet data instead of a wireless network.264 In
one case, the court ordered that, if WhatsApp was not already “equipped
with a caller identification option,” it must add that feature.265 In the
other case, the court ordered that if WhatsApp “cannot comply,” the
government could “install and use its own pen register and trap and trace
devices” pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain information
including “date, duration, and timestamp of communication,” as well as
IP addresses, which can be used to discern location.266
In contrast, Apple’s iMessage appears to be able to provide “query
logs” in response to pen/trap orders that include dates, times, and IP
addresses, but it is unable to provide real-time responses or to confirm
that a message was actually sent or received.267 Signal, another
encrypted messaging app, appears not to store any information about
user communications other than “the date and time a user registered with

262. Id. at 283.
263. Id.
264. See Application, In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the
Installation & Use of a Pen Register Device &/or a Trap & Trace Device &/or Caller Identification
Option Device on Tel. No. 1-614-369-5045, United States v. Pen Register, No. 2:16-mj-00254NMK (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2016), ECF No. 1; Application, In re Application of the United States for
an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, United
States v. WhatsApp Inc., No. 6:15-cm-60087-EFM-1 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2015), ECF No. 1.
265. Order to Service Provider at 2, In re Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register Device &/or a Trap & Trace Device &/or
Caller Identification Option Device on Tel. No. 1-614-369-5045, United States v. Pen Register, No.
2:16-mj-00254-NMK (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2015), ECF No. 3.
266. Order as to WhatsApp Inc., United States v. WhatsApp Inc., No. 6:15-cm-60087-EFM-1 (D.
Kan. May 26, 2016), ECF No. 2.
267. Sam Biddle, Apple Logs Your iMessage Contacts — And May Share Them with Police,
INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://bit.ly/2d9K3nF [https://perma.cc/WPQ4-5LS9].
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Signal and the last date of a user’s connectivity to the Signal service.”268
It is unclear what Signal could or would produce if it were required to
install a pen/trap in order to collect, in real time, additional information
about user communications.
These examples illustrate that the government’s authority under the
Pen/Trap Statute to compel encrypted services to turn over keys or
collect additional user information remains unclear. Moreover, as the
government seeks to compel encrypted services to comply with court
orders in ways that are legally and technologically new, it does so
behind closed doors—without even explaining its assertions of authority.
B.

Understanding Interpretations of Statutory Authority

In light of the evident difficulties courts experience as they grapple
with how to apply old law to new technologies, enhancing access to
records reflecting the government’s legal reasoning and statutory
interpretations would “play[] a particularly significant positive role in
the actual functioning of the process” of issuing surveillance orders.269
Given the proliferation of encrypted messaging services that promise to
be more secure than traditional electronic communications, it is
particularly striking that the courts have been so silent on the application
of surveillance authorities to the acquisition of communications
metadata in these new settings. Despite the salience of these questions,
there is very little information about how law enforcement actually
interprets and uses its authority that is available to Congress, the courts,
or the public.
By way of contrast, the public has had access to some rulings on
electronic surveillance. For example, the disagreement between Judges
Orenstein and Gorenstein regarding the government’s ability to acquire
prospective location information pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute is
distinctive in part because it was so public. Likewise, several courts have
addressed in published opinions whether the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes
the government to obtain “post-cut-through dialed digits,” the numbers
that one might dial after an initial connection is complete, which may
include social security numbers, account numbers, numeric voicemail
passwords, or extensions.270 And several magistrate judges have publicly

268. Grand Jury Subpoena for Signal User Data, Eastern District of Virginia, SIGNAL (Oct. 4,
2016), http://bit.ly/2dYcs2M [https://perma.cc/2NT4-6AJU].
269. Press Enterprise II, 478 US 1, 11–12 (1986).
270. In re United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 412 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (listing cases).
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rejected efforts to obtain warrants and court orders authorizing
overbroad electronic searches.271
However, it remains fairly unusual for magistrate judges to publish
decisions regarding government applications for surveillance. Opacity is
structurally embedded deep within the courts: magistrate judges, the
federal courts’ “worker bees,” tend not to write as many published
opinions as Article III judges.272 Partly as a result, in many areas in
which the government proposes novel constructions of statutory
authority to support new investigative methods, “[t]he courts and the
Government would all benefit from additional case-law
development.”273 As one court recognized, “the best way to test the limit
of the Government’s authority may be through developed records, trial
court opinions on suppression motions, and appellate review.”274
By informing the public about how the government conducts
electronic communications surveillance, release of surveillance records
could also foster a better social understanding of technology and enrich
the debate about the meaning of Fourth Amendment protections in the
information age. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, “technological
changes can alter societal expectations of privacy.”275 But technological
change must be publicly known in order for social expectations of
privacy to shift accordingly. Indeed, keeping secret information about
the scope of the government’s surveillance authorities only fuels the
argument that users are unaware that they are “voluntarily” or
“knowingly convey[ing]” information to third party providers.276
Presumptive unsealing of electronic surveillance orders at the
conclusion of an investigation would also permit the public to better
understand the government’s position on its statutory authority.
Recognizing a right of access to post-investigation surveillance materials

271. See Ann E. Marimow & Craig Timberg, Low-Level Federal Judges Balking at Law
Enforcement Requests for Electronic Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2014), http://wapo.st/2l5r9lt
[https://perma.cc/J36K-PCRU].
272. Id.
273. In re United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 412–13.
274. Id. at 413.
275. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2013).
276. See In re Application of United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A cell phone customer has
not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way. As
the EFF notes, it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers
collect and store historical location information.”).
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would also systemically “contribute to ongoing case law”277 by making
the public, legislatures, and courts aware of how surveillance authorities
are interpreted and used. As one author points out, “[i]f more magistrates
routinely published such decisions, the DOJ’s practical monopoly on
information about how it uses (or abuses) its surveillance powers would
be put to an end, and the ex parte expansion of government surveillance
authority would be conclusively exposed.”278 Permitting public access to
electronic surveillance orders can achieve the same ends without placing
additional, onerous burdens on the federal judiciary.
C.

Improving the Criminal Justice Process

Increased transparency for electronic surveillance applications and
orders is also consonant with an emerging trend of increasing
transparency for police departments plagued by misconduct. Sunlight as
a remedy for misconduct is visible in settings as disparate as structural
reform litigation and the policy debates about deployment of body
cameras.279 Transparent, public filings in support of requests for court
orders authorizing surveillance provide a crucial tether between police
investigations, which necessarily occur in secret, and the public. In an
era in which law enforcement increasingly stands accused of lacking
“sufficient democratic authorization,”280 the closure of court records that
authorize police to use intrusive investigative tools is a particularly
troubling development.
Public access may improve the criminal process for at least two
reasons. First, making police aware that the public will—at some
point—be able to read an affidavit offered in support of an application
for surveillance may deter police misconduct and perjury. Barry
Friedman and Oren Bar-Gill have argued that requiring ex ante search
warrants, as a rule, may improve police decision making because police
277. Reid Day, Let the Magistrates Revolt: A Review of Search Warrant Applications for
Electronic Information Possessed by Online Services, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 520 (2015).
278. Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 590 (2007).
279. See, e.g., Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 42
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 160 (2008) (arguing that the chief value of police consent decrees
is in “institutional transparency and the provision of information to the public”); Stephen Rushin,
Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1396 (2015)
(analyzing trends in structural litigation reform); Allyson Scher & Ariel Spierer, Policing Project to
Assist LA: When to Release Body Camera Footage, POLICING PROJECT (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://bit.ly/2lMUroT [https://perma.cc/38S5-ML8B] (describing pressures on police departments to
release bodycam footage of police shootings).
280. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, supra note 23, at 1834.
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are aware that their search requests will be scrutinized. Drawing on a
significant body of social science research, Friedman and Bar-Gill argue,
“the process of seeking a magistrate’s approval actually is likely to
induce police officers to reach better decisions, either by forcing them to
articulate reasons or by leading them to consider what the magistrate
will do.”281 Friedman and Bar-Gill believe that police, “cognizant of the
fact that their warrant applications will be scrutinized carefully, will not
bother filing weak applications.”282 Public access bolsters this rationale:
if applications for surveillance were subjected to scrutiny by the public,
police may engage in more robust decision making when they seek the
relatively low-cost tools available under the SCA and the Pen/Trap
Statute.
Electronic surveillance materials are doubly insulated from public
view because, unlike traditional Rule 41 warrants, surveillance statutes
provide no suppression remedy. While search warrants are “at the center
of pre-trial suppression hearings, and suppression issues often determine
the outcome of criminal prosecutions,”283 there is no suppression remedy
for violations of the SCA or the Pen Register Statute.284 Every Circuit to
have considered the issue has held that there is a First Amendment right
of access to suppression hearings.285 Indeed, some of the important cases
construing the government’s authority to obtain certain types of
information under the SCA arise from suppression hearings.286 As a

281. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609,
1642 (2012).
282. Id. at 1640.
283. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th
Cir. 1988).
284. United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1548
(2015) (“The Act has a narrow list of remedies, and—unlike the Wiretap Act, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515—suppression is not among them.”); United States v. Rigmaiden, CR 08-814-PHX-DGC,
2013 WL 1932800, at *10 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051,
1056 (9th Cir. 1998)) (“Suppression is not an available remedy for violations of the SCA.”).
285. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 813 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Washington Post Co.,
807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986); Application of The Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1984);
United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169–71 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Criden, 675
F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982); cf. In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 635 F.2d 676, 678
(8th Cir. 1980) (remanding under Gannett for failure to make adequate findings justifying closure).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that
“acquisition of historical CSLI from Defendants’ cell phone provider did not violate the Fourth
Amendment,” and suppression was unwarranted); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890
(6th Cir. 2016) (“[S]uppression of evidence is not among the remedies available under the Stored
Communications Act.”); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (holding that the government’s acquisition of historical cell tower information
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result, it should be unambiguous that a First Amendment right of access
attaches to electronic surveillance materials filed in connection with
suppression hearings. But because exclusion—the traditional ex post
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations—is unavailable in the
electronic surveillance context, the public right of access to suppression
hearings does not really help enhance public understanding of police
practices.
The potential for shaming provides another, far more traditional
rationale for the functional benefits of transparency. In a recent article,
Lara Bazelon discusses a specific type of “judicial shaming” that “occurs
when the court takes the prosecutor to task during an oral argument for
defending grave misconduct that led to a wrongful conviction.”287
Shaming is a quintessentially “public sanction.”288 Noting that “[t]he
second most common cause of wrongful convictions is official
misconduct, trailing only false testimony,” Bazelon discusses how the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act stripped federal court
judges of their ability to remedy wrongful convictions.289 In response,
she argues, some federal courts are turning to public shaming as a
remedy for egregious misconduct by prosecutors. Bazelon quotes Judge
Kozinski, who echoed the First Amendment case law when he argued,
“[j]udges who see bad behavior before them, especially prosecutors who
wield great power and have greater ethical responsibilities, must hold the
misconduct up to the light of public scrutiny.”290 Bazelon concludes that
the efficacy of public shaming turns on the amount of “public exposure”
misconduct receives. “Shaming sanctions require public condemnation.
They require spectacle,” Bazelon writes.291
Holding police individually accountable for misusing investigative
tools comports with the history of the Fourth Amendment, as well.
During the eighteenth century, targets of unlawful searches brought
actions for trespass against the officers who had searched their homes.292
was not a search, and that suppression was therefore not required); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013) (same).
287. Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct
Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 318 (2016).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 330.
290. Id. at 351.
291. Id. at 348.
292. See, e.g., Cuddihy and Hardy, supra note 165, at 385 (1980) (describing trespass cases of
Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money); Davies, supra note 163, at 588 (“Because a general warrant
was clearly deemed illegal by the framing era, it did not protect either the issuing magistrate or the
executing officer against trespass liability.”).
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By cloaking electronic surveillance in secrecy, courts prevent observers
from holding the government or its officers accountable for wrongdoing.
But in the area of criminal justice, as the Supreme Court has
admonished, public reporting and access to information “guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”293
D.

Facilitating Democratic Accountability

Access to information about electronic surveillance also plays a
particularly positive role in the absence of congressional or judicial
reporting of aggregate data concerning the use of surveillance
authorities. As Paul Schwartz has put it, societal understanding of the
scale of electronic surveillance is “largely precluded by the haphazard
and incomplete information that the government collects about it.”294
The paucity of data concerning warrantless electronic surveillance
sets it apart from other kinds of law enforcement tools. The Pen/Trap
Statute and the SCA lack provisions requiring judicial reporting on the
number of times the authority is used each year.295 Under the Pen/Trap
Statute, the Attorney General is required to submit annual reports to
Congress on the Department of Justice’s use of the authority, but the
Department has “routinely failed to submit the required reports.”296 In
contrast, the Wiretap Act requires the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts to generate annual reports concerning data on interceptions of
oral, wire, or electronic communications under Title III. Likewise, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires annual reporting on the
number of times the government applies to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court for an order authorizing foreign intelligence
surveillance.297 Nor does the government publicly report, on an annual

293. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
294. Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287,
287 (2008).
295. Nevertheless, the data from the FJC study suggests that the numbers are in the thousands, if
not the tens of thousands, each year.
296. Naomi Gilens, New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in
Warrantless Electronic Surveillance, ACLU (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://bit.ly/2kQc0pF
[https://perma.cc/3EHG-FJD5]. The Stored Communications Act lacks any congressional reporting
requirements whatsoever.
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012) (requiring semiannual reporting to the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees and Select Committees on Intelligence regarding the number of national
security letters issued); 50 U.S.C. § 1807 (2012) (requiring the Attorney General to report to the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts and to Congress “(a) the total number of applications made for
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basis or otherwise, the number of gag orders it obtains each year to
prevent service providers from disclosing the number of requests.298 In
the absence of any kind of comparable data source, public access to
electronic surveillance applications and orders, at a minimum, may give
the public a sense of the frequency with which the SCA and the
Pen/Trap Statute are used.
IV. COMPELLING NEEDS FOR SECRECY?
If the right of access attaches, the First Amendment requires judicial
documents to be unsealed unless the government establishes a
“compelling need” for secrecy and shows that sealing is narrowly
tailored. How might the right of access be applied to statutes that require
or authorize sealing without any factual findings, let alone the
demanding showing required under Press-Enterprise II?
That the First Amendment standard can only be satisfied by factspecific showings counsels strongly against statutory standards that
create blanket invitations to secrecy. As a general rule, courts must make
“specific findings” on the record to demonstrate that the right of access
has been overcome.299 In ongoing investigations, it should be easy for
law enforcement to demonstrate that there is a compelling need for
secrecy of surveillance materials.300 When an investigation is ongoing,
public access to surveillance documents is likely to play a negative role
by potentially alerting targets that they are under surveillance.
Nonetheless, the need for secrecy during investigations does not
require that the documents filed in connection with those proceedings
never see the light of day. To the contrary, courts routinely find that
justifications for closure erode over time: even where proceedings are
properly closed, the First Amendment may require that a transcript be
published “once the danger of prejudice . . . dissipate[s].”301 When courts
grant sealing orders, they may incorporate sunset provisions or
requirements that the government inform the court if the “conditions for
orders and extensions of orders approving electronic surveillance under this subchapter; and (b) the
total number of such orders and extensions either granted, modified, or denied”).
298. See In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (nondisclosure
order accompanies ninety-seven percent of NSLs).
299. See Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (following Second,
Fourth and Ninth Circuits in requiring courts to make “specific findings . . . on the record” to justify
sealing plea agreements).
300. In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 292 (4th Cir.
2013).
301. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979).
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unsealing” occur.302 Even grand-jury materials, which are inarguably
subject to exceptionally strong secrecy requirements, might someday
become public.303
The effect of blanket secrecy requirements like those in the Pen/Trap
Statute is to categorically and indefinitely shield records long after any
interest in secrecy, no matter how compelling, has dissipated. These
secrecy requirements ignore that facts change. Where a criminal
investigation has come to an end—whether it results in an indictment or
no judicial action at all—there is no obvious government interest in
secrecy sufficiently compelling to justify sealing tens of thousands of
judicial documents. Once an investigation is concluded, the right of
access can shine a light on law enforcement activity that may otherwise
remain secret indefinitely. Applying the constitutional test to electronic
surveillance orders strongly suggests that the First Amendment right of
access should attach to electronic surveillance applications and orders
after an investigation has terminated.
Now, several cases are challenging the long-term, unjustified sealing
of pen registers and other electronic surveillance applications and orders.
In recent litigation in the District of Columbia, a journalist sought access
to each application, affidavit, and court order under the Pen/Trap Statute
and the SCA.304 In response, the government published a list of the
docket information for pen registers and trap-and-trace orders issued in
2012—a total of 235 matters—and proposed that only 10% of the
matters ought to be unsealed in whole or in part.305 While the court
ultimately concluded that a First Amendment right of access did not
attach to the records sought, it did recognize that the public had a
common law right that required the clerk’s office and the prosecutor’s
office to publish additional information concerning surveillance
applications and orders.306 Ongoing litigation in the Northern District of
302. United States v. Dwyer, 629 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2015); see also T. S. Ellis, III, Sealing,
Judicial Transparency and Judicial Independence, 53 VILL. L. REV. 939, 949 (2008) (“[E]very
order sealing records should explicitly limit its own duration or, alternatively, require the party
seeking protection to reappear and reestablish the necessity of the seal.”).
303. Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that district courts
retain discretion to disclose historical grand jury materials).
304. Petition, In re The Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Electronic Surveillance
Applications and Orders, No. 1:13-mc-00712-BAH (D.D.C. July 16, 2013), ECF No. 1.
305. Fourth Joint Status Report, In re The Application of Jason Leopold (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2017),
ECF No. 28.
306. In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & Orders, No. 13-MC00712, 2018 WL 1129660, at *32 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2018) (recognizing a prospective right of access
under the common law).
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California is also seeking docketing and unsealing of court records
related to matters arising under the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the
Pen/Trap Statute.307
A second proposed justification for secrecy stems from concerns
about the individual privacy of those who are targeted. Communications
surveillance records might be particularly sensitive and revelatory, and
access to documents pertaining to surveillance may invade individual
privacy. Many have noted that even “transactional” records related to
communication can disclose highly sensitive information related to
political, religious and expressive associations,308 eroding the contested
boundary between “content” and “metadata.”309 Because surveillance
orders do not require probable cause, many targets of surveillance may
not even be criminal suspects.
Others have noted that public access to pretrial judicial documents
may be particularly invasive in cases in which charges against an
individual are dropped, or the defendant is ultimately acquitted:
[E]ven in cases where charges were wrongfully brought—a case
of mistaken identity, perhaps, or simply a misunderstanding—
the record of that individual’s history in the criminal justice
system will remain. Rarely will this record note that the charges
were dismissed, or that the individual was found to be
innocent.310
One recent disclosure is instructive. In May 2012, the Associated
Press and other news organizations published an article concerning a
307. See discussion supra at notes 17–19. In an earlier case seeking access to historical
applications and orders under the Pen/Trap Statute, a federal court ruled in a minute order that the
documents at issue “are not subject to the First Amendment Right of Access,” apparently on the
basis that an investigation was ongoing. United States v. Pen Register, No. 2:10-mj-01235 (S.D.
Tex. June 4, 2015). In the one case in which the United States did not oppose the unsealing, the
Court determined that the Wall Street Journal’s motion to gain access was moot. Sealed Matter, No.
2:07-mc-127 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015); see also Brian L. Owsley, To Unseal or Not to Unseal: The
Judiciary’s Role in Preventing Transparency in Electronic Surveillance Applications and Orders, 5
CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 259 (2014).
308. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 744 (2008) (“Current legal doctrine,
which centers on ‘privacy’ and hence on protecting the content of communications, does not
adequately account for the extent to which relational surveillance threatens to chill expressive
association in today’s networked world.”).
309. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 210, at 70 (arguing that the binary content-metadata
distinction has “dire consequences for privacy on the Internet”); Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of
Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1453 (calling for the “abandonment” of the
“envelope analogy” that calls for leaving metadata unprotected).
310. Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online
Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 783–84 (2012).
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disrupted terrorist plot to use an upgraded “underwear bomb” on an
aircraft.311 After the Associated Press published its story, the government
confirmed the account.312 The FBI then opened a leak investigation of
the disclosure, which implicated sensitive and classified national
security information.313 In the course of investigating, the FBI secretly
subpoenaed two months of telephone records from the Associated
Press.314 After receiving the records, the FBI then applied for an SCA
order compelling Google to turn over email records belonging to one of
the reporters.315
The subpoenas became public less than a week later, and the leaker in
that case—Donald Sachtleben—pleaded guilty in September 2013.316
But the application for the reporter’s email records remained under seal
until September 2017, when the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press successfully moved to unseal it. Although the reporter’s name
and the name of the publication are redacted, there are more than enough
details in the records to reconstruct the identities of both. Indeed, if this
episode were not already public, this form of disclosure could raise
substantial privacy concerns. But the fact that the records remained
sealed even after the investigation was made public and had been closed
for four years simply illustrates the overbreadth of the secrecy
requirement.
Publicizing surveillance-related court records, therefore, is not
without its drawbacks as a policy matter. But the fact that surveillance
311. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, US: CIA Thwarts New Al-Qaida Underwear Bomb Plot,
YAHOO! (May 7, 2012), https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-cia-thwarts-al-qaida-underwear-bombplot-200836835.html [https://perma.cc/5B85-D33N]; Greg Miller & Karen DeYoung,
Al-Qaeda Airline Bomb Plot Disrupted, U.S. Says, WASH. POST (May 7, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-disrupts-airline-bombplot/2012/05/07/gIQA9qE08T_story.html [https://perma.cc/P2F2-T2SE]; Eyder Peralta, CIA
Thwarts New, More Sophisticated Underwear Bomber, NPR (May 7, 2012),
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/05/07/152207969/reports-cia-thwarts-new-moresophisticated-underwear-bomber.
312. Associated Press, CIA ‘Foiled Al-Qaida Bomb Plot’ Around Anniversary of Bin Laden
Death, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/07/cia-al-qaidabomb-plot [https://perma.cc/76BB-N5YG] (“The White House confirmed the story after the AP
published it on Monday afternoon.”).
313. Charlie Savage, Former F.B.I. Agent to Plead Guilty in Press Leak, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/fbi-ex-agent-pleads-guilty-in-leak-to-ap.html.
314. Sari Horwitz, Under Sweeping Subpoenas, Justice Department Obtained AP Phone Records
in Leak Investigation, WASH. POST (May 13, 2013), http://wapo.st/10uGlF6 [https://perma.cc/SC66QAD4].
315. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), No.
1:13-mc-00460-AK*SEALED* (D.D.C. May 7, 2013), ECF No. 1.
316. Savage, supra note 313.
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materials in individual cases may implicate individual privacy rights
does not mean that there is no history or logic of access to those
materials. As the Fourth Amendment history illustrates, the public has
long had access to information about the execution of searches—
information that was critical to understanding how and when
government searches were abusive and unconstitutional. Implicit in this
history is the idea that the Fourth Amendment’s protections are
endangered when searches are executed in secret. As the Second Circuit
noted when articulating the need for safeguards for “sneak and peek”
searches, secret searches increase the risk that “officers will exceed the
bounds of propriety without detection.”317
In specific cases, individual privacy interests might well involve a
compelling need for secrecy that could outweigh the public’s right of
access to surveillance materials. Courts can address this by applying the
constitutional standard for closure of court records. Nor is this an all-ornone project: courts can also use traditional, narrowly tailored methods
of safeguarding privacy in public records, such as the use of redactions
to anonymize the identifying details of innocent surveillance targets.
Critically, however, the First Amendment demands that judges make
these determinations on the facts of specific cases, not on the basis of
general principles.
More to the point, this argument raises a graver issue that lies at the
very core of the need for increased transparency and public oversight of
surveillance. It is a matter of the utmost public concern if law
enforcement is routinely targeting innocent individuals for secret
surveillance without notice. The government invades those individuals’
privacy when they are targeted for surveillance, not only when it is later
exposed. Efforts to shield that surveillance from view tend to preserve
what Patrick Toomey and Brett Max Kaufman called the “notice
paradox”: “the people the government deprives of notice will never
know that it chose not to provide notice to them.”318 The position is akin
to New York City’s defense of its programmatic surveillance of Muslims
after September 11: the plaintiffs who were under surveillance were
injured, not by the surveillance itself, but by the Associated Press’s
reporting of the program. This absurdist stance, as the Third Circuit
aptly described it, amounts to: “[w]hat you don’t know can’t hurt you.
And, if you do know, don’t shoot us. Shoot the messenger.”319 Put
317. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990).
318. Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 848.
319. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 2015).
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another way, the government should not be able to secretly surveil
innocent people and then avoid scrutiny by asserting that revealing the
government’s privacy-invasive activity would infringe on their privacy.
CONCLUSION
Widespread sealing and secret docketing practices for materials
related to the SCA and pen register/trap and trace orders obscure key
data about law enforcement’s use of surveillance, including legal
interpretations. Recognizing that a First Amendment right of access
attaches to these materials would not, however, open all of them to
immediate scrutiny. A right of access that attaches after an investigation
has concluded would not jeopardize law enforcement techniques or the
integrity of the ex parte proceedings seeking surveillance. Far from it—
some additional sunshine in this dimly lit area would not only have a
salutary effect on surveillance and policing, but it is also consonant with
historical practice, as the First Amendment requires. And in truly
compelling circumstances, the First Amendment right of access might
yield to law enforcement’s compelling interest in secrecy, even after an
investigation has ended, to keep the materials under seal.
In other words, courts should treat surveillance orders like other court
records under the First Amendment. Applying these generally held
principles of constitutional law to surveillance orders would rectify the
unexplained disparity that exists between access to surveillance orders
and access to other documents filed in connection with pretrial criminal
proceedings.

